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Collapsing Corporate Structures: Resolving the 
Tension Between Form and Substance 
By Steven L. Schwarcz* 
Courts, legislatures, and policymakers constantly must ask: when is a corporate 
structure legitimate, and when should it be collapsed? Although most urgent in 
the context of widespread but increasingly complex structured finance transac-
tions which utilize multiple corporate entities as part of an overall structure, I the 
question also arises in other important corporate contexts, including piercing the 
corporate veil (regarded as "one of the most litigated areas in American corporate 
law"),2 substantive consolidation, recharacterizing sales as transfers intended for 
security, and collapsing leveraged buyout ("LBO") transactions. In a larger sense, 
it is one of the most fundamental questions in corporation law, at the basis of any 
finding that the private ordering of a firm-or of the relationship between firms-
is unenforceable or that the law should disrespect form in favor of substance. 
That is the question this Article engages. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In isolated contexts, judges and scholars have attempted to formulate rules for 
determining when to collapse or recharacterize corporate structures. They have 
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1. See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Enron and the Use and Abuse oj Special Purpose Entities in Corporate 
Structures, 70 U. ON. L. REv. 1309, 1314-15 (2002) [hereinafter Schwarcz, Enron and the Use and 
Abuse oj Special Purpose Entities in Corporate Structures] (discussing structured finance's use of multiple 
special-purpose corporate entities, or SPEs-sometimes referred to as SPVs). References in this Article 
to "corporate" structures or entities mean structures or entities composed of one or more corporations, 
limited liability companies (LLCs), partnerships, andJor other separately identifiable non-natural 
bodies. 
2. Handel C. H. Lee &: David M. Blumental, Parent Company and Shareholder Liability: "Piercing the 
Veil" oj Chinese Corporate Subsidiaries, 5 Bus. L. INT'L 221, 223 (2004) (citing Robert B. Thompson, 
Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 CORNELL L. REv. 1036, 1036 (1991)). 
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not, however, seen the question as cutting across isolated doctrines. Nor have 
they attempted to formulate rules of general application, much less an overall 
theory from which to derive such rules. 
This failure leaves the law with unsettling ad hocery, which in tum creates 
uncertainty and inefficiency For example, any legal rule that enables the collaps-
ing or recharacterizing of a transaction in order to respect "substance" over "form" 
will make parties much less likely to engage in the transaction, and may even 
deter parties from entering into similar transactions altogether. 3 When economi-
cally beneficial transactions are prevented, all parties suffer.4 
The failure also creates multiple levels of inconsistency 5 It is difficult, for ex-
ample, to distinguish cases in which a court collapses an LBO transaction by 
viewing it overall as a "black box"-examining only the starting and ending points 
of the transaction and ignoring the interim steps6-from the reluctance of courts 
to recharacterize structured financing transactions that, similarly viewed,7 would 
be seen as loans.s Furthermore, even within doctrinal categories, the cases are 
often irreconcilable.9 
This Article attempts to reconcile these disparate rules, to inquire into the 
normative justifications for formulating rules that collapse or recharacterize cor-
porate structures, to fundamentally ask: when should the law respect, and when 
3. See Douglas G. Baird &: Thomas H. Jackson, Fraudulent Conveyance Law and Its Proper Domain, 
38 VAND. L. REv. 829, 834 (1985) ("The power of creditors to set aside transactions after the fact 
limits the ability of debtors to engage in the transactions in the first instance."). 
4. See id. at 855 ("The uncertainty such a rule imposes makes debtors and creditors as a group 
worse off."). 
5. For a discussion of the importance of consistency in a commercial law system, see Steven L. 
Schwarcz, A Fundamental Inquiry Into the Statutory Rulemahing Process of Private Legislatures, 29 GA. L. 
REv. 909, 940-44 (1995) [hereinafter Schwarcz, A Fundamental Inquiry Into the Statutory Rulemahing 
Process of Private Legislatures]. 
6. See infra Part II.D. 
7. I attempt to distinguish these cases, however, in Part III.D, infra. 
8. [In] a typical example from structured financel,l [a] company settles a trust by transferring 
financial assets to the trust in return for payment in the form of trust certificates and a bargained-
for residual interest in the trust. The company then raises funds by selling the trust certificates 
to capital market investors, who buy the certificates expecting that the trust assets will generate 
sufficient cash to repay their investment plus the contractual rate of return specified in the 
certificates. The residual interest entitles the company to any assets remaining in the trust once 
the certificates are paid in full. In this way, the company does not give up more value than 
needed to make the deal work. 
The deal is thus an arm's-length, negotiated bargain in which all parties benefit. The investors, 
as senior claimants of the trust, get their money back with interest. The company, as residual 
claimant, receives payment for the financial assets sold to the trust and is entitled to any residual 
value of those assets once the investors are paid in full. In economic terms, the deal is similar to a 
secured loan-the quintessential commercial transaction-in which surplus collateral is returned 
to the debtor once lenders receive principal and interest. 
Steven L. Schwarcz, Commercial Trusts as Business Organizations: Unraveling the Mystery, 58 Bus. LAw. 
559, 562-63 (2003) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). 
9. See, e.g., Vincent M. Roche, "Bashing the Corporate Shield": The Untenable Evisceration of Freedom 
of Contract in the Corporate Context, 28]. CORP. L. 289, 289 (2003) (observing that even the most 
developed of these doctrines, veil-piercing, is "usually stated in broad terms that offer little or no 
guidance to judges or litigants in subsequent cases, [thereby creating] a prime opportunity for courts 
to disturb, under the cover of the law's ambiguity, validly executed, freely negotiated agreements."); 
Thompson, supra note 2, at 1036--37 (same). 
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should it disrespect, form over substance and the manner in which firms purport 
to structure their legal relationships? 
To this end, the Article first examines and synthesizes existing sources of law 
on collapsing or recharacterizing corporate structures. 1O Although the focus is 
primarily on U.s. law, many of the same considerations appear to be present in 
other common-law jurisdictions, II as well as in at least some if not many civil-
law jurisdictions. 12 The synthesis reveals a range of judicial responses to related 
fact patterns. It also suggests that judges implicitly have been grappling with one 
of the most difficult conceptual problems of contract law: the circumstances under 
which externalities should defeat contract enforcement. 13 By addressing that prob-
lem directly through contract theory and economics, this Article proposes a more 
systematic, consistent, and, arguably, conceptually satisfying approach to solving 
the problem of collapsing or recharacterizing corporate structures. 14 Finally, the 
Article examines how this approach might inform, or be informed by, the related 
debate over whether limited liability should be the default rule in corporation 
law. 
II. EXISTING SOURCES OF LAW ON COLLAPSING OR 
RECHARACTERIZING CORPORATE STRUCTURES 
A. PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL 
The doctrine of "piercing the corporate veil" is a prime example of the tension 
between form and substance in the corporate-law environment. As a general rule, 
shareholders are not liable for corporate obligations,15 and thus parent-firms are 
not liable for the obligations of their subsidiaries. 16 By respecting the corporate 
form, this rule facilitates the purpose for which corporate structures are created-
10. Recall that these sources of law include piercing the corporate veil, substantive consolidation, 
recharacterizing sales as transfers intended for security, and collapSing LBO transactions. See supra 
notes 1-2 and accompanying text. 
11. I say this based on feedback to a February 9, 2004 keynote speech on this Aniele that I gave 
at the 2004 Annual Conference of Commercial Law Teachers of Australia and New Zealand, held at 
The Australian National University Faculty of Law. 
12. See Lee & Blumental, supra note 2, at 226-29, 229-38 (discussing veil-piercing jurisprudence 
in Germany and China, respectively). 
13. References herein to "externalities" mean negative externalities. See infra note 77 and accom-
panying text. 
14. This Anicle addresses that problem in pan by emplOying a two-step analysis: first, using a 
Kaldor-Hicks standard of efficiency for collapsing (inefficient) corporate structures; second, examining 
the extent to which, notwithstanding Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, corporate structures should be collapsed 
(or other remedies provided) in order to internalize externalities. This approach resolves the dilemma 
that using Kaldor-Hicks efficiency alone is inadequate, whereas using a Pareto efficiency standard 
would render any corporate structure with non-internalized externalities---effectively most corporate 
structures-inefficient. See infra notes 78-101 and 119-149 and accompanying text. 
15. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Umited Uability and the Corporation, 52 U. 
CHI. L. REv. 89, 89-90 (1985) ("The rule of limited liability means that the investors in the corporation 
are not liable for more than the amount they invest. "). 
16. By "parent-finns," I mean finns that own a majority of the shares of, or otherwise control, other 
firms. 
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limitation of liability 17 Courts, however, may look through, or "pierce," the cor-
porate form in order to assign subsidiary liability to shareholders and parent-firms 
in certain circumstances. 18 The discussion below focuses on the relationship be-
tween subsidiaries and their parent-firms, but it could apply equally to the rela-
tionship between any shareholders-including individuals-and the firms in which 
they hold stock. 19 
Courts limit the remedy of piercing the corporate veil to situations where 
parent-firms so control and dominate their subsidiaries that corporate indepen-
dence is lacking and the parent and its subsidiary are effectively alter egos. 20 Even 
then, veil piercing is only appropriate where the subsidiary is improperly used, 
causing damage or harm-such as preventing the subsidiary'S creditors from be-
ing repaid 21 For example, courts will sometimes pierce the corporate veil of an 
undercapitalized subsidiary to reach the parent-firm's assets (though undercapi-
talization alone appears to be an insufficient basis for piercing the veil)22 based 
on the following rationale: 
If limited liability is absolute, a parent can form a subSidiary with minimal 
capitalization for the purpose of engaging in risky activities. If things go well, 
the parent captures the benefits. If things go poorly, the subsidiary declares 
bankruptcy, and the parent creates another with the same managers to engage 
in the same activities. This asymmetry between the benefits and costs, if 
17. See Easterbrook &: Fischel, supra note 15, at 93-97 (explaining in detail the theory and rationale 
of limited liability). Indeed, some have argued that the modem corporation could not exist without 
limited liability. See Henry Manne, Our Two Corporation Systems: Law and Economics, 53 VA. L. REV. 
259, 262 (1967). 
18. See, e.g., Mobil Oil Corp. v. Linear Films, Inc., 718 f Supp. 260, 268 (D. Del 1989) (piercing the 
corporate veil); David Stegman, Is it Ever Too Late to Add a Party?, 25 U. DAYTON L. REV. 263, 264 
(2000) ("Even if a corporation has been formed in accordance with the applicable statutory provisions, 
a court may pierce the corporate veil, refuse to recognize the corporate entity, and impose liability on 
individual shareholders for corporate debts."). 
19. JAMES D. Cox ET AL., CORPORATIONS § 7.16, at 299 (2d ed. 2003) ("Problems regarding [re-
specting or disregarding] the corporate entity frequently arise within the context of parent and sub-
sidiary or between affiliated corporations. The same principles apply here as to individual shareholders 
and their corporations."); John A. Swain &: Edwin E. Aguilar, Piercing the Veil to Assert Personal juris-
diction Over Corporate Affiliates: An Empirical Study of the Cannon Doctrine, 84 B.U. L. REV. 445, 447, 
452 (2004) (same); also cf. Henry Hansmann &: Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder 
Liability for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.j. 1879, 1932 (1991) [hereinafter Hansmann &: Kraakman, 
Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts] (arguing, in the context of discussing veil 
piercing, that "any arbitrary line between corporations in which shareholders can be held personally 
liable ... and those in which they cannot-whether between subsidiaries and nonsubsidiaries or 
between closely-held and publicly-traded firms-will create unnecessary and costly problems."). 
20. Mark A. Olthoff, Beyond the Form-Should the Corporate Veil Be Pierced?, 64 UMKC L. REv. 311, 
312 (1995); see also Cox, supra note 19, § 7.08, at 280-81; Steven L. Schwarcz, The Inherent Irration-
ality of judgment Proofing, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1,38 n.199 (1999) [hereinafter Schwarcz, The Inherent 
Irrationality of judgment Proofing]. 
21. Olthoff, supra note 20, at 312; Cox, supra note 19, § 7.8 (arguing that the factors that justify 
piercing the corporate veil are the failure to observe proper corporate formalities, including the failure 
to maintain an arm's length relationship between the firm and its subsidiary, and the use of the 
subSidiary as a shell or conduit for risky transactions). 
22. Thompson, supra note 2, at 1038. 
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limited liability were absolute, would create incentives to engage in a socially 
excessive amount of risky activities.23 
Professor White has attempted to loosely synthesize the doctrine of piercing 
the corporate veil: "Although the tests for veil piercing are hardly precise, their 
factors coincide more or less with the acts a parent would have to take to insulate 
itself from liability generated by a subsidiary."24 Even this statement, however, is 
overly broad as Professor White himself admits, because "corporations create sub-
sidiaries to insulate themselves and other subsidiaries from some liabilities. "25 
Indeed, if any act taken by a parent to insulate itself from a subsidiary's liabilities 
were grounds for piercing the corporate veil, then the parent-subsidiary relation-
ship often would be meaningless. 26 The veil-piercing doctrine instead appears 
more limited: to avoid wrongful acts taken by a parent in order to insulate itself 
from liability generated by a subsidiary, where fairness and equity suggest that the 
obligations of the subsidiary be satisfied by the parentY Unfortunately, this sub-
jective focus leads to inconsistencies in the manner in which the veil-piercing doc-
trine is applied, and may explain why the doctrine is so conceptually confusing.28 
B. SUBSTANTIVE CONSOLIDATION 
In a bankruptcy context, courts have devised a doctrine in some ways similar 
to piercing the corporate veil, referred to as "substantive consolidation. "29 This is 
23. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAw 
57 (l991). A subsidiary may be undercapitalized from its inception (see Pierson v. Jones, 625 P.2d 
1085, 1087 (Idaho 1981) (finding liability where a corporation was undercapitalized based on the 
"nature and magnitude of the corporate undertaking ... at the time of the inception of the corpora-
tion.") (emphasis removed)) because the parent has failed to infuse additional capital as necessary (see 
DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc. v. W Ray Flemming Fruit Co., 540 F2d 681 (4th Cir. 1976)), or because 
the parent has drained the subsidiary of its assets (see, e.g., Eastridge Dev. Co. v. Halpert Assocs., Inc. 
853 F2d 772, 780 (lOth Cir. 1988) (allowing a claim directly against the parent, where the parent 
acquired a subsidiary, cancelled its liability insurance, and drained the subsidiary of assets in order to 
thwart the claim of a tort creditor)). 
24. James]. White, Corporate}udgment Proofing: A Response to Lynn LoPucki's The Death of Liability, 
107 YALE L.]. 1363, 1401-02 (1998). This lack of precision is hardly limited to U.S. law: See, e.g., Lee 
& Blumental, supra note 2. "Chinese courts have been piercing the corporate veil for almost a decade, 
but unfortunately there is no established legal framework for extending liability to a company's share-
holders." Id. at 222. "In piercing cases, PRC [Peoples Republic of China] couns often allude to the 
familiar themes of control or domination, undercapitalization, commingling of assets and disregard 
for corporate formalities, and deception or fraud. However, it is not clear which of these factors, or 
what combination of these factors, PRC couns find most persuasive." Id. at 231-32. "There is clearly 
a need for a more coherent piercing doctrine in China." Id. at 238. 
25. White, supra note 24, at 1399. 
26. Professor White's analysis focuses, however, on why liabilities cannot be reduced to zero. See id. 
27. See, e.g., Olthoff, supra note 20, at 318 (requiring the plaintiff to prove that "unless the corporate 
veil is pierced, it will have been treated unjustly by the defendant's exercise of control and improper 
use of the corporate form and, thereby, suffer damages."); Cox, supra note 19, § 7.08, at 276 ("The 
facts presented [for veil piercing] must demonstrate some misuse of the corporate privilege or establish 
a need to limit it in order to do justice."). 
28. Cf Swain & Aguilar, supra note 19, at 451 (observing that "[djisceming the precise contours 
of [veil] piercing doctrine is notoriously problematic."). 
29. See In re Cont'l Vending Mach. Corp., 517 F2d 997, 1000 (2d Cir. 1975) (noting the similarities 
between piercing the corporate veil and substantive consolidation). 
114 The Business Lawyer; Vol. 60, November 2004 
an equitable doctrine under which bankruptcy judges can disregard the corporate 
form by ordering "pooling of the assets and liabilities of two or more related 
entities."30 As a result, "the liabilities of the entities involved are then satisfied 
from the common pool of assets created by consolidation. "31 
Substantive consolidation requires, as a minimum, a substantial breakdown of 
corporate formalities between the firms being considered for consolidationY In 
such cases, creditors or shareholders of those firms can ask the court to consider 
whether substantive consolidation is appropriate.33 Though within the court's 
discretion, that determination is not taken lightly. Besides representing a repudi-
ation of corporate-contractual arrangements, substantive consolidation can dra-
matically affect the rights of litigants.34 For example, the debt-equity ratio of a 
substantively consolidated firm would only coinCidentally equal the debt-equity 
ratio of each constituent firm prior to the consolidation. Substantive consolidation 
will thus benefit creditors of higher debt-equity ratio firms at the expense of 
creditors of lower debt-equity ratio firms.35 
Accordingly, any decision to substantively consolidate two or more firms ad-
ditionally requires the court to weigh the benefits of consolidation against any 
harm to objecting creditors. 36 Only where those benefits heavily outweigh the 
harm is substantive consolidation appropriate37 Substantive consolidation is thus 
30. Eastgroup Props. v. S. Motel Ass'n., Ltd., 935 F.2d 245, 248 (lIth Cir. 1991); see also Mary 
Elisabeth Kors, Altered Egos: Deciphering Substantive Consolidation, 59 U. PITT. L. REV. 381, 381 (l998) 
(defining substantive consolidation as "the effective merger of two or more legally distinct (albeit 
affiliated) entities into a single debtor with a common pool of assets and a common body of liabilities."). 
31. Eastgroup Props., 935 F.2d at 248. 
32. Id. at 249 (requiring the proponent of substantive consolidation to show "there is substantial 
identity between the entities to be consolidated"); see also In re Vecco Constr. Indus., Inc., 4 B.R. 407, 
410 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1980); 5 WILLlAM MILLER COLLIER, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY~ 1100.06(3) (law-
rence P King ed., 15th ed. 1989 &: Supp. 1996); Chern. Bank N.Y. Trust Co. v. Kheel (In re Seatrade 
Corp.), 369 F.2d 845,847 (2d Cir. 1966); In re Manzey Land &: Cattle Co., 17 B.R. 332, 338 (Bankr. 
D.5.D. 1982). These cases list such factors as the degree of difficulty in segregating and ascertaining 
individual liabilities and assets; the presence or absence of consolidated financial statements; the 
commingling of assets and business functions; the unity of ownership and interests between the 
corporate finns; the guaranteeing by the parent firm of loans of the subsidiary; and the transfer of 
assets without formal observance of corporate formalities. The presence of some or even many of 
these factors does not necessarily mean, however, that a court will order a substantive consolidation. 
STEVEN L. SCHWARCZ, STRUCTURED FINANCE: A GUIDE TO THE PRINCIPLES OF ASSET SECURlTlZATION 3-
23 (3d ed. 2003) [hereinafter STRUCTURED FINANCE). 
33. See, e.g., In re AugieJRestivo Baking Co., Ltd., 860 F.2d 515, 516 (2d Cir. 1988). 
34. Id. at 518 ("[W)e have stressed that substantive consolidation 'is no mere instrument of pro-
cedural convenience ... but a measure vitally affecting substantive rights''') (quoting Flora Mir Candy 
Corp. v. R.S. Dickson &: Co., 432 F.2d 1060, 1062 (2d Cir. 1970)). 
35. Jeffrey E. Bjork, Seeking Predictability in Bankruptcy: An Alternative to judicial Recharacterization 
in Structured Financing, 14 BANKR. DEY. J. 119, 138 (1997); see also In re Auto-Train, Corp., 810 F.2d 
270, 276 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (observing that because the entities to be consolidated are likely to have 
different debt-eqUity ratios, substantive consolidation "almost invariably redistributes wealth among 
the creditors of the various entities."). 
36. See, e.g., Schwarcz, The Inherent Irrationality ofJudgment Proofing, supra note 20, at 37 (discussing 
judicial discretion to order substantive consolidation as a means of limiting "judgment proofing"). In 
the Second Circuit, substantive consolidation is even stricter, requiring that no innocent creditors be 
harmed. Augie/Restivo Baking Co., 860 F.2d at 519. 
37. Eastgroup Props., 935 F.2d at 249; Auto-Train, Corp., 810 F.2d at 276. 
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generally disfavored, though the recent trend has been to allow it more liberally 
in response to increasingly complex corporate structures38 
C. RECHARACTERIZING SALES AS TRANSFERS INTENDED FOR 
SECURITY 
The tension between form and substance also arises in the context of securi-
tization transactions. These are transactions in which the firm originating the 
transaction (the "originator") contracts to sell financial assets, such as accounts 
receivable, loans, or lease rentals, to a bankruptcy-remote special-purpose vehicle 
("SPV"), which in turn raises money from capital market investors39 on the 
strength of those financial assets.40 
In form, securitization transactions are contractually-arranged sales of financial 
assets. In economic substance, however, they are not dissimilar to transfers in-
tended as security (i.e., loans secured by the financial assets)Y This disparity 
between form and substance is central to the most critical issue in a securitization: 
whether the transfer of financial assets from the originator to the Spy is, in fact, 
a "true sale"-meaning that the transfer has effectively removed those assets from 
the originator's estate to become property of the Spy for bankruptcy purposes. If 
the transfer is not a true sale, it is deemed to be merely a loan secured by the 
financial assets; and the Spy then may be unable to obtain payments collected 
on those assets until the end of the bankruptcy case.42 That inability would hurt 
the SPY's investors, although it would likely help the originator and its creditors. 
For this reason, courts concerned about the originator or its creditors some-
times find that the transfer of financial assets is not actually a true sale, rechar-
acterizing it instead as a secured loan.43 The law governing such recharacterization 
is not, however, well settled.44 To the extent coherent case law has developed, 
38. Eastgroup Props., 935 E2d at 248-49. 
39. The capital markets are "markets where capital funds--debt and equity-are traded. Included 
are private placement sources of debt and eqUity as well as organized markets and exchanges." JOHN 
DOWNES &. JORDAN ELLIOT GoODMAN, DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND INVESTMENT TERMS 59 Od ed. 
1991). 
40. The details are actually more complicated, though unnecessary to this Article's analysis. After 
purchasing the financial assets, the Spy transfers such assets to a second Spy The second Spy then 
issues securities to the capital market investors and uses the proceeds of the issuance to pay the first 
Spy for the financial assets. The first Spy then uses those proceeds to pay the originator. See Steven 
L. Schwarcz, Securitization Post-Enron, 25 CARDOZO L. REv. 1539, 1540 (2004) [hereinafter Schwarcz, 
Securitization Post-Enron} (symposium issue on "Threats to Asset-Based Finance"). The investors in the 
securities are repaid from collections of the financial assets, and therefore buy the securities based on 
their assessments of the value of those assets. Id. For a more complete discussion of securitization, 
including these transactional steps, see STRUCTURED FINANCE, supra note 32; Schwarcz, The Inherent 
Irrationality oj Judgment Proofing, supra note 20, at 6; Steven L. Schwarcz, The Alchemy oj Asset Secur-
itization, 1 STAN. J. L. Bus. &. FIN. 133, 135-36 (1994). 
41. See supra note 8 and accompanying text (observing that, in economic terms, securitization deals 
are similar to secured loans). 
42. STRUCTURED FINANCE, supra note 32, at 4-3 (discussing the automatic stay in bankruptcy and 
other consequences of recharacterization). 
43. Id. at 4-4 (discussing such recharacterization in the In re LTV Steel Co. case). 
44. See id. at 4-5. "Although various courts have considered whether a given transfer of [financial 
assets} constitutes a sale or a secured loan for bankruptcy purposes, the facts of the decided cases 
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a cluster of factors can be identified that are relevant in most determinations 
of whether a given transfer of [financial assets] is a sale or a secured loan. 
Each of these factors is indicative of whether the originator truly parted with 
the future economic risks and benefits of ownership of the [assets] purported 
to be sold, and whether the Spy has taken on those risks and benefits.45 
This determination, however, can be highly subjective.46 
D. COLLAPSING LBO TRANSACTIONS 
Courts again confront the tension between form and substance when examining 
failed LBO transactions.47 In an LBO, a group of investors, sometimes associated 
with the management of the firm being acquired, takes control of that firm (the 
"target firm") by indirectly causing it to borrow and using the proceeds to purchase 
have not been representative for the most pan of modem asset-securitized transactions. Accordingly, 
the cases are not easily harmonized, and different readers can argue as to which factors are relevant 
and which are entitled to the greater weight." Id. Indeed, recent legislative attempts have sought to 
formalize the notion of true sale. Prior to the Enron debacle, section 912 of the then-pending Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act of 2001 would have created a "safe harbor" for true sales in securitization trans-
actions; but this provision was deleted post-Enron. See Schwarcz, Securitization Post-En ron, supra note 
40, at 1542 n.14; see also Steven L. Schwarcz, The Impact of Bankruptcy Reform on "True Sale" Deter-
mination in Securitization Transactions, 7 FORDHAM]' CORP. &: FIN. L. 353, 353-54 (2001). More 
recently, Sen. Dick Durban and Rep. William Delahunt introduced legislation that would authorize 
bankruptcy judges to "recharacterize as a secured loan, a sale ... if the material characteristics of the 
sale ... are substantially similar to the characteristics of a secured loan." S. 2798, lO7th Congo § 102 
(2002). This legislation also was withdrawn, though similar legislation may be introduced at a future 
date. See Securitization Post-Enron, supra note 40, at 1542 n.I8. 
45. STRUCTURED FINANCE, supra note 32, at 4-5. 
46. For example, one of the primary factors identified is the amount and nature of the SPV's 
recourse against the originator in the event the financial assets lose value; a true sale is thought to 
transfer substantive risk on those assets from the Originator to the Spy Id. However, even though 
"securitization deals do shift actual risk, they always require the company originating the deal to retain 
sufficient first-loss risk on the transferred assets, usually in the form of 'overcollateralization,' to min-
imize the investor risk to an investment grade level." Schwarcz, Enron and the Use and Abuse of Special 
Purpose Entities in Corporate Structures, supra note 1, at 1316 n.38 (arguing that the originator should 
retain the first-loss risk because of the asymmetric information between the Originator and the SPV's 
investors). First-loss risk can be easily distinguished, however, from Enron's Spy transactions, in which 
virtually all risk was placed on Enron itself. See William C. Powers, Jr. et aI., Report of Investigation 
by the SpeCial Investigative Committee of the Board of Directors of Enron Corp. 36-37 (Feb. 1,2002); 
Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking the Disclosure Paradigm in a World of Complexity, 2004 U. ILL. L. REv. 
1,2 (2004); see also SENATE PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, REpORT ON FISHTAIL, BACCHUS, 
SUNDANCE, AND SLAPSHOT: FOUR ENRON TRANSACTIONS FUNDED AND FACILITATED BY U.S. FINANCtAL 
INSTITUTIONS, S. REp. No. 107-82, at 2 (2003), available at http://govt-aff.senate.gov!010203psirepon. 
pdf (last visited Oct. 19, 2004). 
47. Although LBO transactions have waned in popularity since their heyday in 1980's, they are 
always liable to return to prominence if shareholder value becomes depressed. Lee Hammer, Turning 
a Blind Eye: The Ninth Circuit's Approach to Fraudulent Conveyances and Leveraged Buyouts, 31 SW. U. 
L. REv. 237, 242 (2002) (noting that "[a]lthough the new mantra of the corporate world is 'merger' 
and not 'leveraged buyout,' this scenario could change if the stock market falters and depresses the 
value of shareholder equity."). 
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its stock.48 The target firm's shareholders benefit by being bought out at a pre-
mium.49 The investor group benefits where, as is typical, the value of the target 
firm exceeds its market capitalization 50 And formally the target firm receives 
adequate consideration for each independent transaction. 51 An LBO transaction 
thus might appear immune to challenge. 
Nonetheless, LBOs can impair claims of the target firm's existing creditors. The 
borrowed funds add to the target firm's overall debt burden without increasing 
its assets,52 and in many cases existing claims are also effectively subordinated to 
claims of the LBO lender (which are secured by the assets of the target firm).53 If 
the target firm becomes insolvent or goes bankrupt, existing creditors are preju-
diced. 54 Non-adjusting creditors, 55 of course, cannot protect themselves because 
they cannot bargain for interest to offset any increase in risk. 56 Although contrac-
tual creditors theoretically can protect themselves by requiring loan covenants 
restricting their debtor firms from engaging in LBO transactions, experience has 
shown that such creditors generally choose higher interest rates, which mayor 
48. In a typical LBO, for example, the acquisition-minded investors create a single-purpose "shell" 
company, with no assets or liabilities. After obtaining a commitment from lenders to borrow sufficient 
funds to purchase the shares of stock of the target firm, the shell company makes a tender offer for 
those shares. The shell company pays for the purchased shares by drawing down on the loan com-
mitment. After purchasing those shares, thereby acquiring the target firm as a subsidiary, the shell 
company causes the target firm to merge into itself. The merged entity is then given the name of the 
target firm and pledges its assets to the LBO lenders to secure repayment of their loans. See Steven L. 
Schwarcz, Rethinking a Corporation's Obligations to Creditors, 17 CARDOZO L. REv. 647, 685 (1996) 
[hereinafter Schwarcz, Rethinking a Corporation's Obligations to Creditorsl; Sarah B. Foster, Let's Remake 
a Deal: Fraudulent Transfer Laws As a Tool for Restructuring Leveraged Buyouts 297,303 (PU Commercial 
Law & Practice Course, Handbook Series No. A4-4408, 1993), available at WL 649 PLUComm 297. 
49. Schwarcz, Rethinking a Corporation's Obligations to Creditors, supra note 48, at 685. 
50. For an informative though cynical view of this benefit, see Benjamin]. Stein, Shooting Fish in 
a Barrel-Why Management Always Makes a Bundle in an LBO, BARRON'S, jan. 12, 1987, at 6. 
51. See Foster, supra note 48, at 316 (noting that "[oln its face, the [Tabor Court Realty Corp. LBOI 
transaction appeared to be for fair consideration; mortgages were given in return for money."); Kevin 
J. Liss, Fraudulent Conveyance Law and Leveraged Buyouts, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 1491, 1497-98 (1987) 
(describing typical steps in an LBO). 
52. Liss, supra note 51, at 1498-99 ("What benefits, if any, the target receives cannot readily be 
discerned. To the extent that any benefits do accrue to the target, they are at most subsequent and 
indirect."); Schwarcz, Rethinking a Corporation's Obligations to Creditors, supra note 48, at 685; Foster, 
supra note 48, at 303 ("Often, the only change in the target is that it suddenly has to service large 
amounts of new secured debt. "). 
53. Foster, supra note 48, at 303. 
54. LBO transactions can impair the value of existing claims even where the target firm remains 
solvent, by increasing the target firm's debt-equity ratio and prompting rating agencies to reduce its 
bond ratings. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. RjR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504, 1520 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). 
Whether that impairment of value is, or should be, an externality recognized by law is beyond the 
scope of this Article. 
55. Non-adjusting creditors include involuntary creditors, such as tort creditors, as well as vol-
untary creditors that, for whatever reason--e.g., they extend credit on fixed terms or, like some trade 
creditors, their claims are so small that it is impractical to monitor--cannot adjust their interest rates. 
Lucian Arye Bebchuk & jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 
105 YALE L.J. 857, 869-70 (1996). 
56. See, e.g., United States v. Tabor Court Realty Corp., 803 F.2d 1288, 1297 n.2 (3d Cir. 1986), 
cert. denied, 483 U.s. 1005 (1987) (a case "in which the major creditors (in this instance the United 
States and certain Pennsylvania municipalities) are involuntary and do not become creditors by virtue 
of a contract."). 
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may not be a sufficient quid pro quo, to omit such covenants 57 Moreover, where 
the structure of the LBO, or an innovation based thereon, is novel, even otherwise 
adjusting creditors cannot always anticipate, and therefore may be unable to ad-
just for, the deal type.58 
At least one court has collapsed a failed LBO transaction. In United States v. 
Tabor Court Realty,59 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the 
LBO loan and subsequent payment of the loan's proceeds to shareholders were 
"part of one integrated transaction. "60 Thus, the "loan proceeds ... were merely 
passed through the [target firm to its shareholders] and cannot be deemed con-
sideration received by the [target firm.]"6! Because the LBO lender "knew, or 
should have known,. that the money it lent ... was used, in part, to [pay the 
target firm's] shareholders,"62 the court used fraudulent conveyance law to inval-
idate the mortgage granted to the LBO lender. 63 
Though other direct precedents are rare, the Tabor Court Realty decision has 
been viewed by many as mainstream law and not an aberration. 64 The decision, 
however, is not completely free from criticism.65 
57. Larry Light, Bondholder Beware: Value Subject to Change Without Notice, Bus. WK., Mar. 29, 1993, 
at 34 (describing the situation after Marriott Corporation split itself into two pans, causing disgruntled 
bondholders to sue and call for more restrictive bond covenants to prevent other companies from 
taking similar actions: "Bondholders can-and will-fuss all they like. But the reality is, their options 
are limited: Higher returns or better protection. Most investors will continue to go for the gold."). 
58. See, e.g., Tabor Court Realty Corp., 803 F.2d at 1297 n.2 (discussing "the possibility that the 
creditors attacking the leveraged buy-out (such as many of the creditors in this case) became creditors 
before leveraged buy-outs became a common financing technique and thus may not have anticipated 
such leveraged transactions so as to have been able to adequately protect themselves by contract."). 
59. Id. at 1288. 
60. Id. at 1302. 
61. Id. Although the court's ruling is limited to Pennsylvania's enactment of the Unifonn Fraudulent 
Conveyance Act, the court emphasized that Act's similarity to federal fraudulent conveyance law. Id. 
at 1298-99. 
62. Id. at 1295 (affirming the lower court's finding to this effect); see also id. at 1296 (finding that 
the LBO lender "was aware, first, that the exchange would render Raymond insolvent, and second, 
that no member of the Raymond Group would receive fair consideration."). 
63. Accord Lippi v. City Bank, 955 F.2d 599, 606-07 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that whether LBO 
transactions can be collapsed as fraudulent is determined, on a case-by-case basis, by whether the 
panies knew or should have known about the use of proceeds). For further background on fraudulent 
conveyance law, see Liss, supra note 51, at 1497-98, and Steven L Schwarcz, The Impact oj Fraudulent 
Conveyance Law on Future Advances Supported by Upstream Guaranties and Security Interests, 9 CARDOZO 
L REV. 729 (1987). 
64. Margaret Howard, Vern Countryman and Barry Zaretsky: A Legacy oj Ideas, 75 AM. BANKR. L.]. 
283, 289 (2001) ("[Bly 1990, most courts had accepted the applicability of fraudulent conveyance 
law to leveraged buyouts"). 
65. See Baird 1St Jackson, supra note 3, at 835, 854-55 (arguing against applying fraudulent con-
veyance law to LBO transactions because the creditor relationship is largely contractual and thus 
creditors can protect themselves from LBOs through tenns within their contract (id. at 835), and also 
because LBOs are largely efficient and thus should not be discouraged (id. at 854-55)). The Ninth 
Circuit has been most receptive to these arguments and has yet to fully apply fraudulent conveyance 
laws to LBOs. See Hammer, supra note 47, at 240-41. Although I agree that LBOs can be efficient, 
Professors Baird and Jackson largely ignore potential harm to non-adjusting creditors and possibly 
also to adjusting creditors. See supra notes 55-58. 
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E. SYNTHESIS 
All of these doctrines espouse substance over form, but they also share three 
other common traits: they are judicially-created doctrines; they respond to ma-
terial improprieties in a corporate arrangement; and they challenge that corporate 
arrangement to the extent it creates externalities by shielding assets from third-
party (usually creditor) claims. The challenge appears most robust where, as in 
the cases of piercing the corporate veil and collapsing LBO transactions, the cor-
porate arrangement shields assets of a party causing the improprieties. 
For example, the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil collapses corporate 
walls that shield parent-firm assets from claims of a subsidiary's creditors, where 
the subsidiary lacks real corporate independence and is misused by the parent-
firm. The doctrine of substantive consolidation collapses corporate walls that 
shield an affiliate's assets from claims of a firm's creditors and shareholders, where 
there is a substantial breakdown of corporate formalities between the firms being 
considered for consolidation (though this doctrine requires the further finding 
that the benefits of consolidation heavily outweigh any harm). The doctrine of 
recharacterizing sales as transfers intended for security challenges inter-firm con-
tracts that shield transferred assets from claims of creditors of the transferor, where 
the transferor has not truly parted with, and the transferee has not taken on, the 
future economic risks and benefits of ownership of the transferred assets. And 
the doctrine of collapsing LBO transactions challenges inter-firm contracts that 
shield assets of the target-company from its creditors' claims, where the LBO 
renders the target-company insolvent and thus unable to pay its creditors and the 
LBO lender knew or should have known of that potential outcome. 
Furthermore, all of these doctrines are simply means of collapsing or rechar-
acterizing the contractual arrangements that form the corporation. This follows 
from the nexus-of-contracts theory of corporations, under which: 
the corporation [is] a bundle of market-driven actual and hypothetical bar-
gains among shareholders, managers, and other firm participants, including 
outside third parties that deal with the firm. Neither corporations nor their 
shareholders are thought of as having external moral or social obligations 
independent of contract-the corporation because it is not a person, and the 
shareholders because they do not contract for broader responsibilities.66 
Although the doctrines of piercing the corporate veil and substantive consolida-
tion are different from the doctrines of collapSing LBOs and sale recharacterization 
insofar as the type of contract affected, that difference should not affect this Ar-
ticle's analysis.67 
66. J. William Callison, Rationalizing Umited Uability and Veil Piercing, 58 Bus. LAw. 1063, 1065 
(2003). Accord Easterbrook &: Fischel, supra note 15, at 89. 
67. The doctrines of piercing the corporate veil and substantive consolidation are used to collapse 
the walls around corporate structures--treating firms A and B, each with separate creditors, as a Single 
firm against whose assets those creditors have pari passu (Le., equal and ratable) claims. In contrast, 
the doctrines of recharacterizing sales as transfers intended for security and collapsing LBO transactions 
are used to recharacterize or collapse contractual relationships between otherwise intact corporate 
structures. 
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These doctrines thus can be loosely synthesized as judicial attempts to collapse 
or recharacterize corporate contractual arrangements that create externalities by 
shielding assets from third-party claims, triggered by material improprieties in the 
arrangement-especially (though not necessarily) where the arrangement being 
challenged shields assets of a party causing the improprieties. This synthesis, 
however, is both too broad and-because it cannot explain all cases-at the same 
time too narrow. 
I therefore next use contract theory and economics to examine the core of this 
synthesis: challenging contractual arrangements in order to prevent externalities. 
Underlying this challenge is a problem that has long baffled contract theorists: 
the "major conceptual" problem of "[d]etermining which [externalities] are to 
count in constraining the ability of parties to contract with each other. "68 I attempt 
to solve this problem in the context of corporate contracting, and then use the 
solution to articulate a normative rule for collapsing or recharacterizing corporate 
structures. I then test and refine that rule by comparing it to the synthesis of 
pOSitive-law doctrine. Finally, I show that the proposed rule, if adopted as a rule 
of law, would harmonize, clarify, and provide conceptual grounding to the juris-
prudence of collapsing or recharacterizing corporate structures, including those 
discussed in Part II. 
III. ANALYSIS 
The possibility of challenging contractual arrangements in order to prevent 
externalities is an essential element of contract theory.69 As mentioned, though, 
the difficult question is when to allow such challenges. 
A. CONTRACT THEORY AND ECONOMICS 
Contract law presumes that parties will not consensually enter into a contract 
unless each party perceives a net benefit. 70 Courts therefore generally enforce 
contracts absent good reason not to do SO.71 With so much banter about freedom 
of contract,72 however, it might seem surprising that there are any exceptions to 
68. MICHAEL]' TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 20 (1993). This Article argues 
the externalities that are to count for that purpose are those that (i) a contracting party knew or should 
have known would cause material harm to third parties, or (ii) cause harm that manifestly exceeds 
the aggregate benefit of the contracting. See inJra notes 22 7-230 and accompanying text. 
69. See infra notes 72-76 and accompanying text. 
70. TREBILCOCK, supra note 68, at 7. 
71. [d. 
72. See, e.g.,JoHN WEISTART, ET AL., THE CONTRACTS EXPERIENCE § 1.F.7.A (DVD ROM 2003)(video 
colloquium with Girardeau Spann, Hon. Frank Easterbrook, Richard Epstein, Amy Chua, Katharine 
Bartlett, and H. Jefferson Powell presenting differing perspectives on the role of freedom of contract 
in American law); Stephen A. Siegel, Understanding the Nineteenth Century Contract Clause: The Role oj 
the Property-Privilege Distinction and "Takings" Clause Jurisprudence, 60 S. CAL. L. REv. 1 (1986) (dis-
cussing the sanctity of contracts as the norm of judicial thought in the 19th century); Mark Pettit,Jr., 
Freedom, Freedom oj Contract, and The "Rise and Fall," 79 B.V. L. REv. 263,291-98 (1999) (discussing 
the tension between freedom of contract and public policy, and detailing the historical treatment of 
freedom of contract). 
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contract enforcement. There are, though, three factors that make the presumption 
of contract enforceability rebuttable. 73 The first is that the contract would thwart 
or significantly impair legislative policies. 74 The second is that the contract harms 
one or more contracting parties. This is referred to as "paternalism."75 The third 
is that the contract harms or otherwise infringes the rights of non-contracting 
parties. 76 The infringement of non-contracting parties' rights is referred to as a 
negative externality,?7 though for simplicity this Article uses the term externality. 
In this Article's corporate context, paternalism should be insignificant. 78 leg-
islative poliCies might be relevant, and will be considered as applicable. In that 
context, I do not question the merits of specific statutes but merely build my 
analysis on their foundations. 79 Externalities, however, are most likely to arise 
because actions of the contracting parties may well affect, and possibly could 
harm, third parties. 
But the mere existence of externalities should not necessarily defeat contract 
enforcement. Many contracts create externalities, yet they are enforced. When 
examining externalities, one must focus on which externalities should defeat con-
tract enforcement, and under what circumstances. Certainly, a necessary, though 
insufficient, condition for defeating contract enforcement is that the externality 
must affect an identifiable person and cause material harm Bo This minimum 
73. See generally Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking Freedom of Contract: A Bankruptcy Paradigm, 77 
TEX. L. REv. 515, 536-552 (1999) [hereinafter Schwarcz, Rethinking Freedom of Contract: A Bankruptcy 
Paradigm!. 
74. Although impairing legislative policies could be treated as an externality, discussed infra note 
77 and accompanying text, I believe it is clearer to a reader to treat it separately 
75. See Anthony T. Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE L.J. 763,763-64 (1983) 
("In general, any legal rule that prohibits an action on the ground that it would be contrary to the 
actor's own welfare is paternalistic. "). 
76. See Schwarcz, Rethinking Freedom of Contract: A Bankruptcy Paradigm, supra note 73, at 551. 
77. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory 
of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 88 (1989) (citing I. MACNEIL, CONTRACTS: EXCHANGE TRANSACTIONS 
AND RELATIONS 346-47 (1978)); Kronman, supra note 75, at 763; Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas 
Melamed, PropeHy Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 
1089, 1093 (1972); Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1129, 1130 (1986) ("It may generally be agreed that if actions that gratify private preferences produce 
'hann to others,' governmental intervention is appropriate."). The economic definition of externalities 
means "the indirect effect of a consumption activity or a production activity on the consumption set 
of a consumer, the utility function of a consumer or the production function of a producer." 2 THE 
NEW PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 263 (John Eatwell et al. eds., 1987). Legal commen-
tators, however, usually focus on externalities that hann or impose costs on third parties. See, e.g., 
TREBILCOCK, supra note 68, at 58; Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 
89 COLUM. L. REv. 1416,1436-41 (1989); Richard A. Epstein, Surrogacy: The Casefor Full Contractual 
Enforcement, 81 VA. L. REv. 2305, 2325-26 (1995); Richard A. Posner, Blackmail, Privacy, and Freedom 
of Contract, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 1817, 1818-19 (1993). 
78. Cf Schwarcz, Rethinking Freedom of Contract: A Bankruptcy Paradigm, supra note 73, at 546-51 
(arguing that paternalism need not be taken into account when the contracting parties are sophisticated 
and represented by counsel). 
79. Cf Lucian Arye Bebchuk, A New Approach to Corporate Reorganizations, 101 HARV. L. REv. 775, 
776-77 (1988) (examining alternative approaches within bankruptcy reorganization without exam-
ining alternatives to bankruptcy reorganization). 
80. See Schwarcz, Rethinking Freedom of Contract: A Bankruptcy Paradigm, supra note 73, at 557-
60; see also id. at 559 n.249 ("[T]he issue of materiality does not appear to be explicitly addressed-
merely assumed-in most of the scholarly literature. For example, in commenting on Professor Jeffrey 
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threshold reflects the value inherent in freedom of contracting.8l Satisfying this 
threshold does not guarantee a contract will be rejected due to the externality; it 
merely begins the inquiry:82 
This Article starts from the assumption that externalities should be allowed to 
defeat contract enforcement only where that minimum threshold is met83 and the 
externalities cause the contracting in question to become economically inefficient. 
This reflects that the raison d'etre of contracting is efficiency:84 SOCiety should want 
parties to contract in ways that are efficient, and therefore should enforce efficient 
contracts even though there may be externalities.8s For example, a contract to 
build a major downtown construction project causes material harm: incessant 
noise, dust, and traffic impairment. Yet few would want to defeat this contract, 
which ultimately contributes numerous benefits and keeps the city vibrant.86 That 
begs the question, however, of what constitutes efficiency in the face of externalities. 
The law and economics literature generally defines effiCiency as meaning either 
Pareto or Kaldor-Hicks efficiency:87 Pareto effiCiency means, in our context, that 
the contracting in question not only makes the parties to the contract better off 
but makes no other parties worse off.88 That standard, however, necessarily makes 
inefficient any contracting that creates uncompensated externalities. Because of 
this strictness, Pareto efficiency is an impractical standard for policy analysis: 
"[Tlhe conditions for Pareto superiority are almost never satisfied in the real 
Gordon's argument that opting out of standard corporate charter provisions creates an externality 
because parties using the standard provision would have fewer precedents to rely on, Professor Lucian 
Bebchuk observed that 'the positive externalities created by standardization seem to be much larger 
with respect to the features of many technical products--such as VCRs or certain types of commu-
nication and computer systems--and still their magnitude does not appear sufficiently substantial to 
warrant mandatory intervention in these products' features.'") (quoting Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The 
Debate on Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1395, 1405 n.46 (1989)). 
81. Schwarcz, Rethinking Freedom of Contract: A Bankruptcy Paradigm, supra note 73, at 557-60. 
82. Id. 
83. References hereinafter to externalities mean externalities that satisfy that minimum threshold. 
84. See, e.g., A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAw AND ECONOMICS 29 (2003) (arguing 
that contract law is, effectively, "design[edJ ... according to the efficiency criterion"); ANTHONY T. 
KRONMAN &: RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACT LAw 1-2 (1979) ("The fundamental 
economic principle with which we begin is that if voluntary exchanges are permitted ... resources 
will gravitate toward their most valuable uses .... The principle that voluntary exchange should be 
freely permitted in order to maximize value is frequently summarized in the concept (or slogan) of 
'freedom of contract."'); DAVID W BARNES &: LYNN A. STOUT, CASES AND MATERtALS ON LAw AND 
ECONOMICS 180 (1992) (indicating that the efficiency rationale for contracting applies whether Pareto 
or Kaldor-Hicks is used as the efficiency standard). 
85. Another way of thinking about this is that contracting could be inefficient if one or more of 
the Coase theorem assumptions are relaxed. One of those assumptions is that a firm contracts with 
everyone, and therefore fully internalizes the cost of its activities. But that assumption is incorrect to 
the contract creates uncompensated externalities; thus, one must examine the consequences of that 
incorrect assumption. Relaxing the Coase theorem does not show inefficiency; it merely invites a 
further inquiry. 
86. These externalities, however, might be inequitably borne by third parties, such as those living 
or working close to the construction site. In certain circumstances, the law attempts to internalize 
these externalities by making the contracting parties liable for the harm they cause. See infra Part m.e. 
87. See infra notes 88-102 and accompanying text. 
88. See Jules L. Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 509 (1980); 
Thomas j. Miceli &: Kathleen Segerson, Defining Efficient Care: The Role of Income Distribution, 24 j. 
LEGAL STUD. 189, 192 (1995). 
Collapsing Corporate Structures 123 
world."89 Thus, "it is pretty clear that the operating definition of efficiency in 
economics is not Pareto superiority."90 Nor is it a practical standard for analyzing 
actual corporate structures: Most such structures create externalities that cannot, 
pragmatically, be completely internalized.91 
Economists generally accept Kaldor-Hicks as the operating standard of effi-
ciency: "When an economist says that [something] is efficient, nine times out of 
ten he means Kaldor-Hicks efficient."92 Likewise, when an economist says that 
contracting is efficient, he or she usually is thinking of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency.93 
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency means that the aggregate benefit exceeds the aggregate 
harm, including externalities.94 A transaction can be Kaldor-Hicks efficient even 
if the "winners" (the contracting parties and any third parties who are benefited) 
do not compensate the "losers" (e.g., third-parties harmed by externalities) 95 This 
standard of efficiency attempts to balance overall societal benefit and harm. 
Although the appropriate standard for policy analysis,96 Kaldor-Hicks efficiency 
alone may be insufficient for analyzing privately-contracted corporate structures, 
where policy considerations can be less important than actual consequences. Be-
cause Kaldor-Hicks takes externalities into account only by including them in the 
balance of aggregate harm and aggregate benefit, a corporate structure can be 
Kaldor-Hicks efficient even though its externalities are not internalized by the 
89. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw § 1.2, at 14 (4th ed. 1992) [hereinafter POS-
NER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw (4th ed.)]. 
90. ld. Accord Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961, 
1015 (2001) (arguing it is infrequent that a policy is under consideration that will make all panies 
better off, and therefore a Pareto-efficiency standard is usually unhelpful for policy determinations); 
cf Anthony T. Kronman, Contract Law and Distributivejustice, 89 YALE L.J. 472, 487 (1980) ("[U]nlike 
a coun, a legislature must evaluate the effects of proposed rules on classes of persons rather than on 
panicular, identifiable individuals."). 
91. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 13 (6th ed. 2003) [hereinafter POSNER, . 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw (6th ed.)] (observing that "most transactions (and if not a Single trans-
action, then a series of like transactions) have effects on third panies, if only by changing the prices 
of other goods .... The conditions for Pareto superiority [thus] are almost never satisfied in the real 
world."). 
92. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw (4th ed.), supra note 89, § 1.2, at 14. 
93. See, e.g., POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw (6th ed.), supra note 91, at 13 (using the Kaldor-
Hicks model in discussing the efficiency of contract law: "if A values [a] wood carving at $50 and B 
at $120, so that at any [negotiated contract] price between $50 and $120 the transaction creates a 
total benefit of $70 (at a price of $100, for example, A considers himself $50 better off and B considers 
himself $20 better off), it is an efficient transaction, provided that the harm (if any) done to third 
panies (minus any benefit to them) does not exceed $70."); see also Blake D. Morant, Contracts Limiting 
Liability: A Paradox With Tacit Solutions, 69 TUL L. REV. 715, 767-70 (1995) (arguing that Kaldor-
Hicks is the "more practical method of evaluating efficiency" of voluntary contracts, such as indemnity 
agreements). In some cases, however, commentators simplify the analysis in order to avoid having to 
distinguish between Pareto and Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. See, e.g., KRONMAN & POSNER, THE ECONOMICS 
OF CONTRACT LAw, supra note 84, at 2 n.l ("Many contracts have third-pany effects .... We shall 
therefore ignore them."); POLINSKY, supra note 84, at 29 n.16 (presuming "that no one else is affected 
by the contract")' 
94. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw, supra note 89, § 1.2, at 13-14. 
95. [d. § 1.2, at 14. 
96. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 90, at 1015 (arguing for the Kaldor-Hicks standard because 
vinually any governmental policy will benefit some members of the public and hun others, making 
it impractical for government to compensate all those who are hun; the most government could hope 
for is that its policies provide a net positive benefit). 
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contracting parties. The failure to internalize externalities, however, has important 
distributional consequences,97 and even the perception of distributional inequities 
can discourage market participants by undermining expectations98 It may, for 
example, discourage financiers or suppliers of goods and services from extending 
credit to firms, thereby jeopardizing the underlying economic viability of the 
corporate structure. More generally, this dichotomy between efficiency and dis-
tributional consequences is fundamental not only to scholarly debates but also to 
public perceptions99 
To attempt to resolve this dichotomy, at least in the context of collapsing cor-
porate structures, this Article employs a two-step analysis. lOo The first step con-
templates that inefficient corporate structures-using the KaldorcHicks test of 
efficiency-may be collapsed. This step takes externalities into account through 
an aggregate balancing of benefit and harm. The second step examines the extent 
to which, notwithstanding Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, externalities should be inter-
nalized. 101 That step weighs the practicalities of internalizing externalities caused 
by corporate structures and the extent to which the law should respect corporate 
structures that create non-internalized externalities. 
The two-step analysis shows that allowing Kaldor-Hicks efficient freely-negotiated 
corporate structures that internalize intentional externalities is the socially optimal 
result, even though the failure to internalize unintentional externalities may dis-
97. Cf POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw (6th ed.), supra note 91, at 25 (observing that Kaldor-
Hicks efficiency is not intended to ensure equitable treatment because "justice and fairness [are] not 
economic terms"). Concern about distributional consequences led me to analyze externalities in the 
securitization context. See Schwarcz, Securitization Post-En ron, supra note 40, at 1551-68 (arguing that 
securitization transactions, in the aggregate, create net value for non-adjusting creditors; and even 
though non-adjusting creditors sometimes will be harmed where an originator that goes bankrupt 
overinvests the securitization proceeds, that harm should be more than offset in the aggregate by the 
lower interest-cost burden on originators and the liquidity provided to originators that are unable to 
borrow). 
98. See, e.g., Schwarcz, A Fundamental Inquiry Into the Statutory Rulemaking Process of Private leg-
islatures, supra note 5, at 933 ("Fairness encompasses the oft-heard goal of commercial law-preserving 
expectations."); Richard Danzig, A Comment on the Jurisprudence of the Uniform Commercial Code, 27 
STAN. L. REV. 621, 622-23 (1975) ("Commercial law ... deals with a subcommunity ... whose 
primary rules derive from a sense of fairness widespread-if imprecisely defined-within the com-
mercial community."). 
99. See, e.g., Paul Craig Roberts, Who Did More for Mankind, Mother Teresa or Mike Milhen?, Bus. 
WK., Mar. 2, 1998, at 28 (observing that "Milken created wealth, jobs, incomes, and new products 
for large numbers of people, while Mother Teresa redistributed wealth donated by philanthropists."). 
100. My two-step approach is indirectly inspired by the work of Professors Korobkin and Ulen. 
See Russell B. Korobkin &: Thomas S. Ulen, Efficiency and Equity: What Can Be Gained by Combining 
Coase and Rawls?, 73 WASH. L. REV. 329, 342 (1998) (responding to the criticism that economic 
analysis of law fails to address distributive justice concerns by arguing, according to the Second 
Theorem of Welfare Economics, that "issues of equity and efficiency are separable. That is, different 
social policies can independently achieve social goals of equity and efficiency. Society need not seek 
to achieve both goals Simultaneously through a Single policy. "). 
1 0 1. Where contracting parties fail to internalize externalities, government theoretically can miti-
gate distributional inequities through taxation and transfers. For example, government could give tort 
claimants, the most common type of non-adjusting creditor, priority over other unsecured creditors; 
or it could create a fund for paying unpaid tort claims; or it could give tax breaks to unpaid tort 
claimants. Governmental actions of this sort do not, however, appear politically likely at this time. 
This Article therefore focuses on the extent to which contracting parties should internalize their 
externalities. 
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courage some market participants at the margin. 102 It therefore resolves the dilemma 
that using Kaldor-Hicks efficiency alone is inadequate, whereas using a Pareto ef-
ficiency standard would render any corporate structure with non-internalized ex-
ternalities---effectively most corporate structures-inefficient. 
B. FORMULATING A RULE 
The first step of this Article's two-step analysis is to articulate a preliminary 
rule for collapsing corporate structures based on the aforesaid factors that make 
the presumption of contract enforceability rebuttable, taking externalities into 
account only in the aggregate balancing of benefit and harm-according to the 
Kaldor-Hicks model. This yields the follOwing rule: a corporate structure103 should 
be respected unless (x) it thwarts or Significantly impairs legislative poliCies, or 
(y) taking into account externalities, the aggregate harm caused by the structure 
exceeds the structure's aggregate benefit (hereinafter "net harm").I04 
Comparing this rule to the syntheSiS of positive-law doctrine on collapsing 
corporate structures 105 reveals the rule lacks a triggering event for its application. 
Positive law, in contrast, sometimes requires a triggering event: a finding of ma-
terial improprieties in the corporate arrangement. 106 This raises the normative 
question of whether the rule should require a triggering event. 
A triggering event, such as a finding of material improprieties, is not necessarily 
inconsistent with the preliminary rule,107 and there are at least three cogent rea-
sons for requiring it. First, the existence of material improprieties provides a Signal 
to market participants that the structure could be collapsed,108 thereby helping to 
establish the expectations that are essential to corporate and commercial trans-
actions and minimizing the likelihood that innocent third parties who relied on 
102. Cf Kimberly D. Krawiec, Fairness, Efficiency, and Insider Trading: Deconstructing the Coin oj the 
Realm in the InJormation Age, 95 Nw. V. L. REv. 443, 499-500 (2001) (arguing that proscribing a 
form of intentional, but not unintentional, insider trading is the socially optimal result). 
103. As used in this rule, the term "corporate structure" includes legal relationships among firms. 
See supra note 67 and accompanying text. 
104. Cf text accompanying note 92, supra (explaining that Kaldor-Hicks efficiency means that the 
aggregate benefit exceeds the aggregate harm, including externalities). 
105. That syntheSiS is articulated in the first sentence of the paragraph accompanying note 69. 
106. As discussed, this triggering event is especially robust where the corporate arrangement in 
question shields assets of a party causing the improprieties. See supra Part II.E. 
107. The preliminary rule is only intended to posit which externalities should be allowed to defeat 
the presumption of contract enforcement and not intended to prevent courts from looking to other 
factors when deciding whether or not to enforce the contract. See supra notes 73-77 and accompanying 
text (observing that externalities only make the presumption of contract enforceability rebuttable). 
108. The extent to which material improprieties provide an actual signal to market participants 
that the structure could be collapsed will, of course, vary It is likely to be strongest in the veil-piercing 
and collapsing-LBO contexts, the former often involving improprieties that amount to blatant wrong-
dOing, the latter involving the types of improprieties (like funding an insolvent LBO) that should be 
obvious. The Signaling is likely to be weakest in the context of recharacterizing sales as transfers 
intended for security because it sometimes can be difficult to ascertain whether a given agreement 
creates a sale of financial assets or merely a transfer of such assets intended for security. Cf v.ce. 
§ 9-109(a)(3) & cmt. 4 (2004) (including sales of certain types of financial assets under Article 9 of 
the V.CC in order to "avoid[] difficult problems of distinguishing between transactions in which a 
receivable secures an obligation and those in which the receivable has been sold outright. "). 
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the limited-liability rule of corporation law would be harmed by the structure's 
collapse. l09 Second, such a triggering event helps ensure the integrity of the 
limited-liability rule, because "[tlo decide that there are any circumstances in 
which shareholders can be held liable for tort damages even though the formalities 
of the corporate form have been observed is to discard limited liability in prin-
ciple."llo Third, and most important, the triggering event helps manage litigation 
costs by avoiding having to determine whether there is a Kaldor-Hicks imbalance 
merely because a lawsuit is filed. These factors, I believe, outweigh any risk that 
a triggering event will deprive injured creditors of a remedy where a formalistically 
proper corporate structure causes net harm. III 
I therefore propose requiring, as a triggering event, a finding of material im-
proprieties in the corporate structure before applying at least the Kaldor-Hicks 
balancing part of the rule. As so modified, the rule can be restated as follows: a 
corporate structure should be respected unless it (x) thwarts or significantly im-
pairs legislative policies, or (y) has material improprieties and causes net harm. 112 
It is unnecessary, and even potentially limiting, for the rule to attempt to pre-
cisely define what constitutes material improprieties. Courts should define that, 
because material improprieties are more easily recognized than defined.ll3 Ex-
amples of material improprieties that courts have recognized in the past include 
substantial breakdowns of corporate formalities, such 'as difficulty in segregating 
and ascertaining a firm's individual assets and liabilitiesl14 or making significant 
transfers of assets without formal observance of corporate formalities; 115 inade-
quate capitalization or transactions that render a firm insolvent;116 domination of 
a firm by its parent to the extent that the firm's corporate independence is lacking 
and the firm and its parent are effectively alter egos;1l7 and transactions where 
the economic substance belies the corporate form. 118 
109. Vallejo v. Wheeler, 98 Eng. Rep. 1012,1017 (K.B. 1774) (Mansfield, L.J.) (declaring that "[iJn 
all mercantile transactions the great object should be certainty"); see also Schwarcz, A Fundamental 
Inquiry Into the Statutory Rulemaking Process of Private Legislatures, supra note 5, at 928-31 (same). 
These expectations would include, for example, those of parties who extend credit in good faith to 
the parent-finn in a parent-subsidiary structure relying on the limited-liability rule of corporation law. 
See infra notes 231-236 (discussing the limited-liability rule). 
110. See Hansmann & Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, supra 
note 19, at 1932 (emphasis removed). 
Ill. This risk is not as high as it might appear because collapsing a corporate structure does not 
ensure that creditors will be made whole; the contracting parties may have become judgment proof. 
112. Note that the existence of material improprieties does not, per se, trigger collapse or re-
characterization but merely invites further inquiry as to whether collapse or recharacterization is 
appropriate. 
113. This approach follows the judicial litmus test of "I know it when I see it." Jacobellis v. Ohio, 
378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, j., concurring). The Supreme Court adopted such a test for 
adjudicating pornography cases. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15,24 (1973) ("whether 'the average 
person, applying contemporary community standards' would find that the work, taken as a whole, 
appeals to the prurient interest"); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476,489 (1957). 
114. In re Vecco Constr. Indus., Inc., 4 B.R. 407,410 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1980). 
115. Id. 
116. FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAw 70 (2000); see also supra note 54 and accompanying 
text. 
117. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
118. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
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C. INTERNALIZING EXTERNALITIES 
The foregoing analysis constitutes only the first step in this Article's two-step 
analysis of determining when to collapse corporate structures. The second step is 
to examine the extent to which, notwithstanding Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, a cor-
porate structure should be collapsed in order to internalize externalities. 
As discussed, Kaldor-Hicks efficiency takes externalities into account only as 
part of an aggregate calculation. Because the winners (the contracting parties) 
need not compensate the losers (non-adjusting creditors) under that standard, a 
corporate structure can be Kaldor-Hicks efficient even though it causes external-
ities that harm those creditorsU9 To mitigate distributional inequities,120 the law 
sometimes looks beyond Kaldor-Hicks efficiency and tries to internalize exter-
nalities.l2l This section (Part IItC) examines whether and to what extent the law 
should look beyond Kaldor-Hicks efficiency to try to internalize externalities caused 
by corporate structures. 122 
This is a practical inquiry: There is little question that externalities should be 
internalized , 123 but any regulatory measure for accomplishing that should not be 
119. See supra note 95 and accompanying text. 
120. The discussion in this Part lItC focuses on distributional consequences, as opposed to such 
non-distributional notions of fairness as corrective justice, sanctity of promises, or retributive justice. 
See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, The Conflict Between Notions of Fairness and the Pareto Principle, 1 
AM. L & ECON. REv. 63, 64-65 (1999) (referring to these and other theories of fairness that are 
"based, at least in part, on factors unrelated to individuals' well-being. "). 
12L See, e.g., OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAw (1881), Lecture I (arguing that tort 
law had evolved from a standard based on morality to one based on external harm); WILLIAM L 
PROSSER & W PAGE KEETON, THE LAw OF TORTS 22 (5th ed. 1984) (observing that "[tlhe twentieth 
century has seen the development of entire fields of liability in which the defendants are held liable 
for well-intentioned and entirely reasonable conduct, because it is considered to be good social policy 
that their enterprises should pay their way by bearing the loss they inflict."). 
122. This Part lItC does not, therefore, purport to address any distributional inequity that exists 
immediately prior to creation of a corporate structure; it solely addresses distributional inequities 
caused by the structure. 
123. Although the proposition that externalities should be internalized seems axiomatic, some 
might find it useful to articulate the proposition from the standpoint of the Coase theorem, which 
states, in basic terms, that under restrictive assumptions including costless bargaining, well-defined 
property and liability rules, full information, and no other transaction costs, bargaining between 
market players will produce the most socially efficient outcomes regardless of the initial wealth allo-
cation of the players. Coase's conception of efficiency is Pareto effiCiency, as at least one person is 
made better off, while the rest of society is not made worse. This type of Pareto effiCiency is made 
possible by Coase's smooth pricing system in which each player fully internalizes the costs of a bargain 
through price changes in all other contractual relationships into which it has entered. R.H. Coase, The 
Problem of Social Cost, 3 J-L. & ECON. 1 (1960). Thus, under those restrictive assumptions, parties 
adversely affected by externalities will bargain with the source of the externalities to arrive at a socially 
optimal result by internalizing the externalities. See id. at 10. Coase makes this point in an example 
about a cattle herder and farmer with conflicting land use needs: "I think it is clear that if the cattle-
raiser is liable for damage caused and the pricing system works smoothly, the reduction in the value 
of production elsewhere will be taken into account in computing the additional cost involved in 
increasing the size of the herd." Id. at 5. Given such internalization, any Kaldor-Hicks improvement 
will translate into a Pareto improvement. Id. at 2. In the case of corporate structures, however, the 
Coase theorem assumption of costless bargaining is violated because non-adjusting creditors cannot 
bargain. For example, tort creditors obtain their claims involuntarily and have no bargaining power 
to better their claims. See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 55, at 869. Thus, one cannot rely on the 
theorem's prediction that a Kaldor-Hicks improvement will translate a Pareto improvement, and must 
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so costly as to undermine the basic Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. I therefore continue 
the inquiry by examining the costs of internalizing externalities caused by cor-
porate structures. Analytically, it is useful to split this inquiry into two parts: 
intentional externalities, and unintentional externalities. Consider first intentional 
externalities, where the contracting parties enter into a corporate structure in-
tended to harm creditors. 
Regulatory measures for internalizing intentional externalities should be feasi-
ble. 124 Intentional harm would be expected to occur in relatively few cases, and 
in those cases the existence of intent will often be evident from the facts. 125 More-
over, a Kaldor-Hicks standard alone may seem so patently inequitable as to make 
market participants uncomfortable. 126 Perhaps implicitly for these reasons, the 
law often requires intentional externalities to be internalized. For example, under 
both federal bankruptcyl27 and state fraudulent transfer law, 128 virtually any trans-
fer of property or incurrence of an obligation made or incurred "with actual intent 
to hinder, delay, or defraud" creditors can be invalidated.129 
For these same reasons, the preliminary rule should Similarly aim to internalize 
intentional externalities. That could be accomplished by restating the rule as fol-
lows: a corporate structure should be respected unless it (x) thwarts or signifi-
cantly impairs legislative poliCies, or (y) has material improprieties and causes 
either net harm or intentional externalities. 
That restated rule, though, still does not address harm caused by unintentional 
externalities. Even where the contracting parties do not intend to harm creditors, 
it is possible that creditors inadvertently could be harmed. l3O There are two pos-
siblel31 ways this harm could be redressed: by governmental scrutiny of corporate 
make further inquiry. Cf Robert E. Scott, The Truth About Secured Financing, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1436, 
1443 (1997) ("Systematic nonadjustment raises a number of interrelated questions. What are the 
efficiency effects of nonadjustment on debtors' financing choices? What are the distributional conse-
quences of nonadjustment?"). The important question, which I address in the text above, is what 
should be the nature of that inquiry. 
124. These regulatory measures could include collapsing the relevant corporate structure or making 
the contracting parties liable for the hartn they cause. See infra note 132 and accompanying text. 
125. See infra notes 169-179 and accompanying text (examining how to prove intent to hartn 
creditors). 
126. Cf POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw (6th ed.), supra note 91, at 264-65 (arguing that 
there is economic value in adhering to generally accepted moral principles); Krawiec, supra note lO2, 
at 470-7l (recognizing the commonly held presumption that "if investors believe that the stock market 
is systematically unfair and accords advantages to insiders and others with superior access to material 
nonpublic infortnation, then the investors may exit the market."). 
127. 11 U.s.c. § 548 (2000) ("Fraudulent transfers and obligations"). 
128. The fraudulent transfer law of most states is based on the Unifortn Fraudulent Transfer Act, 
which parallels the provisions of the Federal Bankruptcy Code's fraudulent transfer law but applies 
outside of a federal bankruptcy case and has a four-year, rather than one-year, statute of limitations. 
LAWRENCE P. KING & MICHAEL L. COOK, CREDITORS' RIGHTS, DEBTORS' PROTECTION AND BANKRUPTCY 
§§ 6.01-.05 (3d ed. 1997). 
129. 11 U.s.c. § 548 (a)(1)(A). Although the quoted language above is from 11 U.s.c. § 548(a)(1)(A), 
state fraudulent transfer law contains similar language. See, e.g., UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT 
§ 4(a)(l) (2003) 
130. See, e.g., Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 55, at 869-70 (originally raiSing this concern in the 
context of examining the efficiency and distributional consequences of secured lending). 
131. I have previously noted that although government could also mitigate distributional inequities 
through taxation and transfers, those solutions are not politically viable. See supra note 101. 
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structures in order to restrict or prohibit harmful structures, or by making the 
contracting parties liable for the externalities they unintentionally cause (thereby 
internalizing the harm).132 
Government scrutiny of unintentional externalities does not appear feasible. It 
would require a regulatory framework that not only would be very costly133 but 
also, at least in the United States, inconsistent with fundamental notions of con-
tract and corporation law.134 This lack of feaSibility is illustrated by the fact that, 
even though the limited-liability rule of corporation law may generate externali-
ties, government does not "take a more active role in assuring the solvency of 
corporations," as it does with banks and under European corporation law135 That 
would require "continuous regulatory scrutiny of the corporation by an admin-
istrative agency, a statist solution that has thus far been resisted in most nonfi-
nancial industries in the United States."136 Furthermore, the remedy imposed by 
governmental scrutiny could backfire. If, for example, such scrutiny revealed a 
corporate structure that, notwithstanding scrutiny, has been in use, any attempt 
by government to collapse or recharacterize the structure could harm creditors 
of the more solvent firm in that structure. 137 
Making the contracting parties liable for unintentional externalities would also 
be costly Imposing liability, even strict liability, would have minimal deterrent 
value-and thus would not discourage creation of externalities138-precisely be-
cause the externalities are unintentional. 139 Even worse, the imposition of liability 
could give rise to enormous litigation costS.140 To understand why, consider the 
possible standards of liability A strict liability standard would clearly invite a 
multitude oflawsuits by creditors. 141 Any more-nuanced standard of liability, how-
132. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw (6th ed.), supra note 91, at 383 (discussing the "two 
methods of public control-the common law system of privately enforced rights and the administrative 
system of direct public control"). Although the analysis in the text is based primarily on practical 
considerations, it should be noted that a liability regime-Le., making the contracting parties liable 
for the externalities they unintentionally cause-seems more justified on theoretical grounds. Con-
tracting is judged by efficiency standards, so the enforceability of a contract should be similarly judged. 
This does not mean that contracting parties should not be subject to some other rule--such as liability 
for harm caused by the contract's externalities-in order to mitigate such harm. This combination of 
policies gives the benefit of the doubt to freedom of contract, encouraging parties to enter into contracts 
if they believe their resulting benefits will exceed any liability. CJ supra note 100 (explaining that 
issues of equity and efficiency are separable). 
133. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw (6th ed.), supra note 91, at 385. 
134. Id. at 413-14. 
135. Id. 
136. Id. at 414. 
13 7. See infra note 187 and accompanying text. 
138. Indeed, to the limited extent it constitutes a deterrent, a strict liability standard could be a 
double-edged sword, discouraging even some beneficial corporate structures. 
139. The analysis above only need address unintentional externalities. Intentional externalities are 
already covered by this Article's proposed rule. See supra notes 127-129 and accompanying text. 
140. Besides litigation costs, there may be insurance costs to mitigate risk and higher transaction 
costs for all parties who have to allocate this extra risk. These extra costs, which create a small benefit 
for a discrete few, ultimately fall on shareholders, consumers and taxpayers. 
141. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw (6th ed.), supra note 91, at 191 (noting the expense of 
imposing a strict liability standard for externalities). 
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ever, would have no more deterrent value than strict liability but potentially higher 
administrative costs. 
For example, a standard such as negligence or gross negligence would be less 
likely than strict liability to deter the contracting parties from unintentionally 
causing externalities. These standards could have higher costs, however, because 
of the difficulty ascertaining, in any given case, whether the contracting parties 
breached the applicable standard. 142 What, for example, would constitute negli-
gence or gross negligence in creating a corporate structure? Would a solvent firm 
be negligent or grossly negligent if it enters into a structure limiting the amount 
of assets against which potential future creditors could claim? Related questions 
regarding adequacy of a firm's capital to engage in its business sometimes arise 
under bankruptcy fraudulent conveyance law,143 but courts have never been able 
to define with any precision what adequate capital means. 144 
Making the contracting parties liable for unintentional externalities is therefore 
costly and would have minimal deterrent value. Collapsing corporate structures 
that give rise to such externalities would have no greater deterrent value and 
would be even more costly, entailing at least the same litigation costs but increas-
ing costs by harming creditors of the more solvent firm in the structure. 145 
This does not necessarily mean the costs would undermine Kaldor-Hicks effi-
ciency, but it is unrealistic to expect courts to make that determination. The 
resolution is complex because internalizing externalities would reduce harm to 
creditors but, at the same time, reduce benefits to the contracting parties who did 
not intend the harm. Moreover, any reduced harm to creditors would have to be 
offset by benefits that the relevant corporate structure provides to other credi-
tors. 146 To be practical, there needs to be some sort of rough benchmark. The law 
142. Cf POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw (4th ed.), supra note 89, at 260 ("[Sltrict liability 
involves certain costs that negligence liability does not"). It is difficult to predict with certainty, how-
ever, whether overall costs would be higher because a more-nuanced liability standard, particularly 
one of gross negligence, might discourage some litigation. 
143. See 11 U.s.c. § 548(a)(l)(B)(ii)(IJ) (2000). 
144. The debate over what adequate capital means "has engendered confusion over the relationship 
between [the] concepts [of insolvency and inadequate capital]: some courts have equated a finding of 
equitable insolvency with that of unreasonably small capital, whereas others have said that unreason-
ably small capital encompasses financial difficulties short of equitable insolvency" Compare Moody v. 
Sec. Pac. Bus. Credit, Inc., 971 F2d 1056, 1070 (3d Cir. 1992) (comparing United States v. Gleneagles 
lnv. Co., 565 F Supp. 556,580 (M.D.PA. 1983) ("[A] finding of insolvency is ipso facto a finding that 
the debtor was left with unreasonably small capital after the conveyance.") with Murphy v. Meritor 
Sav. Bank (In re O'Day Corp.), 126 B.R. 370,407 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1991) ("It must be remembered 
that '[u]nreasonably small capitalization need not be so extreme a condition of financial debility as to 
constitute equitable insolvency .... "')); see also Barrett v. Cont'l Ill. Nat'l Bank and Trust Co., 882 
F.2d 1, 4 (lst Cir. 1989) (disagreeing with the Gleneagles Inv. Co. court, and requiring "a court to 
examine a company's capital throughout a reasonable period of time surrounding the precise date of 
a challenged transfer" rather than at the time of the transaction); COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 
32, ~ 548.05[3] (outlining the circuit split regarding the proper factors and the correct test courts 
should use to determine whether a firm has "unreasonably small capital"). 
145. This additional harm could be mitigated by including it in the decision-making balance, but 
that complication would increase the litigation cost even further. See infra note 187. 
146. Recall that some firms in a corporate structure will necessarily be more solvent than other 
firms, and thus collapsing the structure would benefit creditors of the less solvent firm(s) but harm 
creditors of the more solvent firm(s). See supra note 35 and infra note 187 and accompanying text 
(discussing offsetting costs and benefits in the substantive-consolidation context). 
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traditionally supplies a benchmark: It does not normally attempt to internalize 
externalities where the internalization would involve high costS. 147 
Because any attempt to collapse corporate structures causing unintentional ex-
ternalities would involve high costs, this benchmark suggests that the law should 
not attempt to collapse those structures. This is a sensible result: Absent intent 
to harm, the actual harm to creditors is likely to be small,148 whereas collapsing 
those structures could generate costs that often exceed the harm being redressed. 149 
I therefore conclude that the law should not attempt to collapse corporate 
structures causing only unintentional externalities. This is a normative conclusion, 
but it is supported by the evolution of positive law intended to internalize exter-
nalities. 150 Nuisance law, the quintessential body of law entitling persons harmed 
by externalities to seek compensation from those causing the externalities, evolved 
from a standard of strict liability to an intentional tort. 151 This shift occurred when 
the nuisance doctrine expanded from strictly physical invasions of noxious sub-
stances, such as sewage unintentionally spilling from a privy to the cellar of a 
neighbor'S house, to less tangible invasions such as noise of low-flying airplane 
and blocking sunlight. 152 There needed to be a tightening of the liability stan-
dard, lest it result in a flood of litigation. Requiring intentionality provided that 
tightening. 153 Similarly, unintentional harm caused by the creation of corporate 
structures is not phYSical. Rather, like airplane noise or blocking sunlight, it is 
intangible and indirect. Therefore, as with nuisance law, restricting liability to 
intentional harm would help prevent a flood of litigation. 
For these reasons, this Article's proposed rule should not require unintentional 
externalities to be internalized, though it should aim to internalize intentional 
externalities. Thus, a corporate structure should be respected, and the contracting 
parties should not be liable, unless the structure (x) thwarts or significantly im-
147. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw (6th ed.), supra note 91, at 191 (observing that litigation 
costs may explain why the common law does not compensate people for rendering external benefits-
"a right of restitution creates a legal claim whenever a benefit is conferred; and the costs of processing 
the claims can be horrendous"); PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 121, at 23 (observing that "lilt does 
not lie within the power of any judicial system to remedy all human wrongs. The obvious limitations 
upon the time of the courts, the difficulty in many cases of ascertaining the real facts or of providing 
any effective remedy, have meant that there must be some selection .... The courts always have stood 
more or less in dread of a 'flood of litigation' involving problems which they are not prepared to deal 
with."). 
148. Cj. Robert E. Scott, The Truth About Secured Financing, 82 CORNELL L REv. 1436, 1443 (1997) 
(suggesting that only systematic harm to non-adjusting creditors should be problematic). 
149. Cj. Morant, supra note 93, at 770 ("in many instances, compensating all losers will be com-
plicated and expensive and, therefore, not efficient. "). 
150. I am not suggesting in this paragraph that positive law outcomes should support normative 
law conclusions, but merely that the logic underlying the evolution of nuisance law is consistent with 
my normative law conclusion. 
151. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 121, at 624-25. 
152. [d. 
153. [d. at 625-26. Another possible reason the liability standard of nuisance law has tightened is 
that other theories of liability have evolved to protect interests in the use and enjoyment of property. 
Cj. id. at 624. 
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pairs legislative policies, or (y) has material improprieties and causes either net 
harm or intentional externalities. 154 
I next test the proposed rule (hereinafter, the "Rule") by applying it to the 
jurisprudence of collapsing or recharacterizing the corporate structures discussed 
in Part II. These applications show that the Rule would harmonize and provide 
conceptual clarity to that jurisprudence. The applications also shed light on how 
the Rule should be refined to maximize its utility 
D. ApPLICATIONS 
1. Piercing the Corporate Veil 
I start by applying the Rule to the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil. If the 
Rule were adopted as a rule of law, there would be two inquiries: first, whether 
the relevant corporate structure thwarts or Significantly impairs legislative policies; 
second, whether the structure has material improprieties and, if so, whether it 
would cause either net harm or intentional externalities. If either inquiry is an-
swered in the affirmative, the corporate structure should not be respected. 
The type of parent-subsidiary corporate structures at issue in the veil-piercing 
context would not appear to thwart or significantly impair any legislative policies. 
The relevant policies are those of corporation law, which regards limited liability 
as fundamental: Shareholders are generally not liable for the debts of their cor-
porations. lss Even undercapitalizing a subsidiary does not violate corporate-law 
policy so long as the subsidiary's capital meets the often artifiCially low minimum 
requirements of the relevant corporation law. ls6 This first inquiry therefore must 
be answered in the negative. 157 
Regarding the second inquiry-whether the relevant corporate structure has 
material improprieties and, if so, whether the structure would cause either net 
harm or intentional externalities-the existence of improprieties is indeed the 
most common justification for invoking the veil-piercing doctrine. Some even 
argue, as does this Article, that veil piercing is only appropriate where there are 
such improprieties. ISS The second inquiry is thus answered in the affirmative to 
154. A reader disagreeing with this proposed rule, however, could consider reformulating it, per-
haps as follows, to also take into account unintentional externalities: a corporate structure should be 
respected unless it (x) thwarts or Significantly impairs legislative policies, or (y) has material impro-
prieties and harms creditors. 
155. See STEPHEN B. PRESSER, PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL § 1:1 (2004); Cox, supra note 19, 
§ 7.7, at 7.11 ("No principle is more engrained in corporate law than that shareholders enjoy limited 
liability"). Although I recognize that some scholars normatively question the doctrine of limited lia-
bility (see infra notes 231-236 and accompanying text), the analysis above only needs to address actual 
legislative policies. 
156. GEVURTZ, supra note 116, § 2.1.2a, at 125, 129. Undercapitalization may well thwart the 
policies of bankruptcy law, but that is separately addressed by the bankruptcy doctrine of substantive 
consolidation. See infra Part III.D.2. 
157. Nonetheless, perceived violations of the legislative policy behind limited corporate liability 
might account for at least some of the subjectivity and inconsistent application of the veil-piercing 
doctrine. See infra note 166 and accompanying text. 
158. See Olthoff, supra note 20, at 312 and PRESSER, supra note 155, §§ 1:8-9 (citing Robert Clark, 
The Duties of the Corporate Debtor to its Creditors, 90 HARV. L. REV. 505 (1977)). 
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the extent there are material improprieties, such as difficulty in segregating and 
ascertaining a firm's individual assets and liabilities, significant transfers of assets 
without formal observance of corporate formalities, inadequate capitalization, or 
domination of a firm by its parent that effectively makes the firm an alter ego. 159 
That answer does not, however, end the analysis. In order to collapse the cor-
porate structure, there also must be a finding of either net harm or intentional 
externalities. Consider first net harm. Because the contracting parties expect to 
benefit from securitization,160 creditors are the only parties who would suffer any 
harm (the harm being that the corporate structure shields assets from their 
claims).161 Piercing the corporate veil thus should be justified where, absent that 
remedy, there is net harm-meaning that the aggregate harm to creditors exceeds 
the aggregate benefit of preserving the structure. 162 
Courts, however, rarely if ever engage in this type of balanCing test when 'ap-
plying the veil-piercing doctrine. Instead, after finding evidence of improprie-
ties,163 judges decide whether to pierce the corporate veil based on their own 
personal notions of fairness and equity;164 and in some cases, the greater the 
improprieties, the more likely are courts to collapse the corporate structure. 165 
This subjective focus leads to inconsistencies in the manner in which the veil-
piercing doctrine is applied. 166 
In contrast, this Article's balanCing test starts with the existence of material 
improprieties but then provides a more objective foundation-that of economic 
efficiency-for the doctrine. Admittedly, however, a balanCing test can be difficult 
to apply. Sometimes the harm and benefits cannot be easily quantified. Further-
more, because veil-piercing could hurt legitimate creditors of the parent firm, the 
balancing is delicate. This delicacy is compounded because the mere possibility 
of a judge piercing the corporate veil adds uncertainty to credit markets by re-
ducing reliance on contractual and corporate arrangements. A practical solution 
is suggested, however, by the substantive-consolidation jurisprudence. 
Substantive consolidation likewise balances benefit and harm. Similarly, the 
mere possibility of a judge imposing substantive consolidation in bankruptcy adds 
uncertainty to credit markets by reducing reliance on pre-bankruptcy contractual 
and corporate arrangements. Therefore, to minimize mistakes and market disrup-
159. See supra note 113 and accompanying text (discussing what should constitute material 
improprieties). 
160. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
161. See supra Part II.E. 
162. See supra note 104 and accompanying text (defining net harm). This balance can be even 
further refined because most of a firm's voluntary creditors can protect themselves from harm, such 
as by adjusting their rates of interest. See supra note 55 (defining non-adjusting creditors). Externalities 
imposed on those voluntary creditors therefore should be insufficient to invoke piercing of the cor-
porate veil. Thus, one need focus only on the harm to non-adjusting creditors. 
163. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
164. Id. 
165. Cf Cox, supra 19, § 7.08 at 280-81 (2d ed. 2003) (listing factors and improprieties to be 
taken into account in veil-piercing analysis and stating, "the more factors that are present, the more 
likely it is that a court will disregard the veil of limited liability"). 
166. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
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tion, courts graft a "heavily-outweigh" standard onto the balancing test, imposing 
substantive consolidation only where the benefits of consolidation heavily outweigh 
its harm. 167 
Veil-piercing jurisprudence similarly would become more pragmatic and attain 
greater predictability by using a modified balancing test inspired by the "heavily-
outweigh" standard used in substantive consolidation. To this end, I propose that 
the "net harm" requirement of the Rule-measured by whether the aggregate harm 
caused by the structure exceeds the structure's aggregate benefit-be replaced by 
a "manifest net harm" requirement, measured by whether the aggregate harm 
caused by the structure manifestly exceeds the structure's aggregate benefit. 168 Thus, 
a corporate structure should be respected, and the contracting parties should not 
be liable, unless the structure (x) thwarts or Significantly impairs legislative pol-
iCies, or (y) has material improprieties and causes either manifest net harm or 
intentional externalities. 
Admittedly, this compromise to the Rule, like any other compromise, is im-
perfect. There may be some sacrifice of integrity because, as discussed below, the 
"manifest net harm" standard pushes the margin away from collapsing corporate 
structures, which in turn can lead to preserving some structures that otherwise 
should be collapsed. 169 The compromise is needed, however, because Kaldor-
Hicks efficiency is difficult to assess in real life. The compromise's imperfections 
are also mitigated because the Rule would collapse a corporate structure with 
material improprieties, even without a finding of manifest net harm, where the 
contracting parties intend the structure to cause externalities. 170 
Intentionality, however, raises two issues: What does it mean for a firm, as 
opposed to a natural person, to have intent to harm creditors; and what does 
intent to harm creditors mean in a legal system that generally condones corporate 
limited liability? The first question is present in any corporate context where intent 
is at issue, and its resolution in those other contexts should be equally relevant 
here. 171 I therefore focus on answering the second question. 
Everyone would agree that malicious intent to harm creditors should trigger 
collapse of a corporate structure in order to protect those creditors; but what if 
parties contract without malicious intent but with awareness that harm may re-
167. See infra note 189 and accompanying text (discussing the "heavily-outweigh" standard). With-
out this standard, a balancing test might be difficult to apply, given that the contracting parties include 
the finn, its subsidiaries, and stockholders. Adjusting creditors also are contracting, in a sense, but it 
is presumed that they will neither gain nor lose but simply adjust their yield to preserve their rights. 
See supra note 162. 
168. This is, of course, a slightly different approach than that of substantive consolidation. Whereas 
substantive consolidation jurisprudence balances the benefits of collapsing the corporate structure 
against the hann of collapSing that structure, the Rule balances the aggregate benefit against the 
aggregate hann of preserving the corporate structure. 
169. See infra note 189. Whether, in those circumstances, the externalities should be internalized 
through liability rather than by collapsing the structure is beyond this Article's scope. 
170. Recall that the second step of the inquiry requires an additional finding of either manifest net 
hann or intentional externalities. 
171. This is essentially an agency question. See, e.g.,JEFFREY D. BAUMAN ET AL., CORPORATIONS lAw 
AND POLlCY 366-73 (5th ed. 2003). 
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suIt? In a legal system that generally condones corporate limited liability, but 
where firms can fail, the contracting parties will know that any corporate struc-
ture, including theirs, creates some risk of harm to creditors. Should that aware-
ness be regarded as intent? I believe that contracting that creates only a low 
probability of third-party harm should not be regarded as intentionally harmful. 
Otherwise, the intentionality standard and corporate limited-liability would con-
flict,l72 and no corporate structure would ever be safe from challenge because 
virtually all contracts create the potential for externalities. 173 
The more difficult question is whether contracting that creates a high proba-
bility of third-party harm should be regarded as intentionally harmful. The tort 
law of nuisance suggests an answer. Its intentionality requirement l74 is satisfied 
not only by malicious intent but also "merely in the sense that the defendant has 
created or continued the condition causing the interference with full knowledge 
that the harm to the plaintiff's interests [is] substantially certain to follow."175 A 
substantial-certainty test is equally appealing as a proxy to satisfy the intentionality 
requirement for collapSing corporate structures. To appreciate why, consider a 
parent -firm leaSing assets to an undercapitalized subsidiary that engages in a high-
risk business, where the parent knows it is substantially certain that third parties 
will be injured by the subSidiary'S actions but unable to recover. If the relationship 
between the parent and its subsidiary has material improprieties, collapsing the 
structure to allow the subsidiary's creditors to get at the parent-firm's assets clearly 
seems appropriate. 176 A court applying the substantial-certainty proxy for intent 
will be able to collapse that structure. 
That leaves open, though, the question of how it is possible to prove knowledge 
itself, the parent-firm's actual state of mind. Sometimes that may be gleaned from 
depositions or cross-examination, but often it will be subjective and unascertain-
able. Here again, tort law suggests an answer. Tortious interference with contract 
occurs not only where a party knows, but increasingly also where it should have 
known, that its actions will interfere with a third party's contract. 177 This proxy 
for knowledge is objectively ascertainable, and there is little reason to protect a 
party that should have known the consequences of its actions. This Article like-
wise proposes, in the context of collapsing corporate structures, that a court 
172. See supra note 155 and accompanying text (discussing limited liability). 
173. See supra note 80 and preceding text (observing that the mere existence of externalities should 
not necessarily defeat contract enforcement because many contracts create externalities). 
174. See supra note 153 and accompanying text (indicating this requirement). 
175. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 121, at 625. 
176. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
177. See, e.g., Prudential Real Estate Affiliates, lnc. v. Long & Foster Real Estate, Inc., 208 F3d 210, 
No. 99-1357, 2000 WL 248170, at *4 (4th Cir. Mar. 6, 2000) (rejecting defendant'S argument that 
it did not know about a franchise agreement's restrictions on the sale of a business because "a factfinder 
could reasonably infer from [the] evidence that [defendant] knew or should have known of the terms 
of" that agreement); cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 5.30 (Tentative Draft No.4, 2003) (im-
puting to the principal notice of a fact "that an agent knows or has reason to know"); DAN B. DOBBS, 
THE LAw OF TORTS § 452, at 1285 (2000) (discussing New Jersey Supreme Court's reasoning that 
defendant would owe a duty of reasonable care to protect against economic harm where defendant 
"knew or had reason to know that such harm was likely."). 
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should be able to infer knowledge in cases where the parent should have known 
that harm was substantially certain to occur. 178 
Given these modifications, a corporate structure should be respected, and the 
contracting parties should not be liable, unless the structure (x) thwarts or sig-
nificantly impairs legislative policies, or (y) has material improprieties and either 
the structure causes manifest net harm or the parties know or should know that 
the structure is substantially certain to cause harm. 
2. Substantive Consolidation 
I next apply the Rule to the doctrine of substantive consolidation. The first 
inquiry is whether the corporate structure being considered for consolidation 
would thwart or significantly impair any legislative policies. Because substantive 
consolidation is a bankruptcy-law doctrine and applies only in the bankruptcy 
context,179 the applicable policies here are those of bankruptcy. 
Three fundamental policies underlie bankruptcy law: equality of distribution 
among creditors, debtor rehabilitation, and economical administration of the 
bankruptcy process. 180 A corporate structure is unlikely to thwart or significantly 
impair the policy of equality of distribution. Although substantively consolidating, 
or combining, the assets and liabilities of affiliated firms often may create greater 
absolute equality among creditors, the policy of equality of distribution (like 
bankruptcy law itself) generally respects contractual inequalities arising out of 
pre-bankruptcy entitlements,181 including corporate separateness. 182 A corporate 
structure also is unlikely to thwart or significantly impair the policy of debtor 
rehabilitation. After all, there is no assurance, ex ante, that a substantively-
consolidated corporate structure would function any more effectively than the 
Original structure. Lastly, although consolidating the assets and liabilities of affil-
iated firms might reduce the cost of bankruptcy administration, bankruptcy law 
already reduces that cost without needing to impose substantive consolidation. It 
does this by procedurally-but not substantively-consolidating affiliated bank-
178. This inference could well explain why some courts are willing to pierce the corporate veil 
based on a combination of material improprieties and significant undercapitalization: in those cases, 
the undercapitalization itself effectively becomes a proxy for intent. 
179. See In re AugieJRestivo Baking Co., 860 F.2d SIS, 518 n.l (2d Cir. 1988). "Courts have found 
the power to consolidate substantively in the court's general equitable powers as set forth in 11 U.s.c. 
§ 105" of the federal Bankruptcy Code. Id. Although each of the other doctrines discussed in this 
Article could be applied in a bankruptcy case, those other doctrines are products of non-bankruptcy 
law. 
180. See Schwarcz, Rethinking Freedom oj Contract: A Bankruptcy Paradigm, supra note 73, at 542-43. 
181. Douglas G. Baird, Bankruptcy's Uncontested Axioms, 108 YALE L.]. 573, 578 (1998). 
182. See, e.g., AugielRestivo Baking Co., 860 F.2d at 518 (refusing to substantively consolidate a 
corporate structure on which certain creditors relied, even though those creditors would have priority 
distribution, because "[t[he sole purpose of substantive consolidation is to ensure the equitable treat-
ment of all creditors."); Eastgroup Props. v. S. Motel Ass'n, Ltd. 935 F.2d 245, 248 (11th Cir. 1991) 
(stating that "[t[he purpose of substantive consolidation is 'to insure the equitable treatment of all 
creditors."') (quoting In re Murray Indus., 119 B.R. 820, 830 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990)). 
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ruptcy cases. 183 In general, therefore, a corporate structure should not thwart or 
significantly impair any bankruptcy policy 
The next inquiry is whether the corporate structure in question has material 
improprieties and, if so, whether the structure would cause either manifest net 
harm or the parties know or should know that the structure is substantially certain 
to cause harm. The actual substantive-consolidation jurisprudence effectively be-
gins with this same inquiry: whether there is a substantial breakdown of corporate 
formalities between the firms being considered for consolidation. 184 Where there 
is such a breakdown, the substantive-consolidation jurisprudence turns to a bal-
ancing test, which weighs the benefits of collapsing the corporate structure (through 
substantive consolidation) against the harm of collapsing that structure. That ap-
proach is not dissimilar to this Article's "efficiency" focus on net harm (though 
the substantive-consolidation jUrisprudence does not explicitly tie its balancing 
test to economic theory)185 Logically, then, one would expect a court to substan-
tively consolidate two firms where the benefit of collapsing the corporate structure 
outweighs the harm of collapsing that structure. 186 
However, because substantive consolidation could hurt third-party creditors of 
the more solvent firm (albeit benefiting third-party creditors of the less-solvent 
firm), the balancing is delicate. 18l This delicacy is compounded because the mere 
possibility of a judge imposing substantive consolidation in bankruptcy adds un~ 
certainty to credit markets by reducing reliance on contractual arrangements. 188 
Therefore, to minimize mistakes and market disruption, courts graft a "heavily-
outweigh" standard onto the balancing test, imposing substantive consolidation 
only where the benefits of consolidation heavily outweigh its harm. 189 For similar 
reasons, as discussed,190 that approach has inspired this Article's adoption of a 
"manifest net harm" standard. 
183. See, e.g., In re Flora Mir Candy Corp., 432 E2d 1060, 1062 (2d Cir. 1970) (distinguishing 
substantive from procedural consolidation under FED. R. CIv. P. 42(a)). 
184. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
185. This Anicle's concept of net harm derives from Kaldor-Hicks efficiency See supra notes 92-
95 and accompanying text. Another possible distinction between these tests is that substantive con-
solidation purpons to be concerned only with the equitable treatment of creditors (see supra note 
182); and thus the balancing test thereunder would be expected to weigh only benefit and harm to 
creditors, ignoring any benefit to the contracting parties. As articulated, however, that test does not 
appear to be so limited. See, e.g., Eastgroup Props., 935 E2d. at 249. 
186. This assumes, of course, the existence of material improprieties. Substantive-consolidation 
jurisprudence also requires that creditors of the more solvent firm relied on that firm's corporate 
separateness, which is almost always the case. Id. at 25l. 
187. Cf supra note 35 and accompanying text (discussing the effect of substantive consolidation 
on creditors of firms with differing debt-equity ratios). 
188. Kors, supra note 30, at 446. Bankruptcy law, as discussed, generally recognizes pre-bankruptcy 
contractual arrangements in order to minimize uncenainty See supra note 181 and accompanying 
text. 
189. Eastgroup Props., 935 E 2d at 249. Presumably given the importance of avoiding mistakes and 
market disruption, courts do not appear to be concerned that the heavily-outweigh standard pushes 
the margin away from a finding a substantive consolidation, thereby preserving some corporate Struc-
tures that otherwise would be collapsed. 
190. See supra note 168 and accompanying text. 
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There is, however, a significant difference between substantive consolidation 
law and the Rule: The former pays little if any attention to intent to cause harm, 
whereas the latter would sometimes collapse structures based on that intent. This 
difference in part reflects different underlying rationales. The authority of sub-
stantive consolidation law derives from a bankruptcy judge'S equitable powers, 191 
and courts have worried that harming even one innocent creditor who relied on 
the limited-liability rule of corporation lawl92 might violate equityl93-a harm that 
may well occur if a corporate structure is collapsed for intent. In contrast, the 
underlying rationale of the Rule is economic efficiency, which (in its Kaldor-Hicks 
form) recognizes that decisions sometimes must be made that harm some for the 
benefit of other objectives. 194 Furthermore, the "material improprieties" require-
ment of the Rule provides a signal to creditors that the structure could be col-
lapsed, reducing their reliance on the structure and minimizing their harm if 
collapse occurs.195 
3. Recharacterizing Sales 
As discussed, the matter of recharacterizing sales as transfers intended for se-
curity (i.e., secured loans) is most clearly at issue in the context of securitization. 
In that context, the Rule predicts precisely, and adds insight into, the arguments 
raised by courts and commentators. 
The Rule's first inquiry is whether the securitization sale contract at issue would 
thwart or significantly impair legislative policies. If all transactions characterized 
by contract as securitization sales were enforced as such, securitization indeed 
could be used in lieu of secured financing as a means of thwarting certain basic 
bankruptcy-law remedies. 196 This is because a securitization sale transfers title to 
the "collateral" to the SPY, thereby obviating a firm's ability in bankruptcy to use 
cash collateral as working capital for its reorganizationl97 or to raise reorganization 
financing by granting to new lenders a lien on collateral that is pari passu with or, 
if needed, having priority over pre-petition liens on the same collateral. I98 
191. 11 U.s.c. §105 (2000). 
192. See supra note 187 and accompanying text. 
193. In re Augie/Restivo Baking Co., 860 F.2d 515 (2d Cir. 1988). 
194. Cf. Kaplow &: Shavell, supra note 90, at 1015 (arguing it is infrequent that a policy is under 
consideration that will make all parties better off). 
195. See supra notes 108-109 and accompanying text. 
196. STRUCTURED FINANCE, supra note 32, at 4-3 to 4-5; cf. Peter Pantaleo et ai., Rethinking the Role 
of Recourse in the Sale of Financial Assets, 52 Bus. LAw. 159, 186 (1996); but cf. Schwarcz, Securitization 
Post-Enron, supra note 40, at 1574 (arguing that, as actually practiced, securitization facilitates bank-
ruptcy policy). 
197. See 11 U.s.c. § 363 (2000). 
198. Id. § 364(c) (noting pre-petition liens being liens or security interests granted by the firm prior 
to the filing of its bankruptcy petition). This assumes the holder of the original collateral receives 
adequate protection. "Adequate protection" is not defined in the Bankruptcy Code. Instead, section 
361 of the Bankruptcy Code provides examples of what may constitute adequate protection, such as 
making periodic cash payments to the creditor (section 3610)) or granting a lien on other unencum-
bered property of the firm (section 361(2)), and leaves it for the courts to decide on a case-by-case 
basis what constitutes "adequate protection" in the circumstances. See, e.g., In re Timbers of Inwood 
Forest Assocs., Ltd., 808 F.2d 363,363 (5th Cir. 1987), aff'd, 484 U.s. 365 (1988); In re AIC Indus., 
Inc., 83 B.R. 774, 777 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1988); In re O.P. Held, Inc., 74 B.R. 777,782-84 (Bankr. 
N.D.N.Y. 1987). 
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For example, in the bankruptcy case of In re LTV Steel CO.,199 LTV challenged 
its pre-bankruptcy securitization facilities, arguing that the securitization transfers 
to the 5PVs were not true sales and, therefore, that LTV should be able to use the 
collections of financial assets as "cash collateral" by giving adequate protection 
under bankruptcy law. LTV's rationale was that, without such use, it might have 
to cease its operations, thereby jeopardizing employee jobs and retiree benefits 
and adversely affecting the local economy. The bankruptcy court permitted LTV 
to use these collections pending resolution of the true sale issue.2OO 
Because of this potential to thwart bankruptcy remedies, courts have articulated 
factors to differentiate sales from secured loans and, based on these factors, have 
recharacterized certain purported sale structures as secured loans.201 50 far this 
parallels the Rule, which would recharacterize a sale structure in order to prevent 
securitization from thwarting or significantly impairing legislative policies. 
The second inquiry under the Rule is whether the applicable securitization-sale 
structure has material improprieties and, if so, whether it causes manifest net 
harm or the parties know or should know that it is substantially certain to cause 
harm. Putting aside for the moment the question of material improprieties,202 I 
focus first on the issue of net harm. 
There has been a backlash by certain scholars against securitization on the 
supposition that it creates externalities by harming a firm's non-adjusting credi-
tors. 203 Uncertainty over the amount of harm may partially account for the mud-
dled state of the law of recharacterizing sales. 204 Recent research shows, however, 
that the harm to non-adjusting creditors caused by securitization should be non-
material, and indeed is likely to be zero or even negative.20s Although individual 
non-adjusting creditors sometimes will be harmed by securitization transactions, 
that harm should be more than offset for non-adjusting creditors as a class by the 
benefits of securitization.206 A fortiOri, given that the contracting parties expect to 
199. 274 B.R. 278 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2001). 
200. [d. at 280, 285-86. That case, however, "should have little importance as a legal precedent 
because, prior to such resolution, the parties reached a settlement that included a summary finding 
that the transfers were true sales." STRUCTURED FINANCE, supra note 32, at 4-4. 
201. See, e.g., STRUCTURED FINANCE, supra note 32, at 4-6 to 4-12 (differentiating by reference to 
the amount and nature of recourse, the existence of retained rights and rights to any surplus, the 
pricing mechanism, and the administration and collection of accounts). 
202. I later discuss this question. See infra notes 211-213 and accompanying text. 
203. See lois R. lupica, Asset Securitization: The Unsecured Creditor's Perspective, 76 TEX. l. REv. 
595, 659 (1998); Edward j. Janger, Muddy Rules for Securitizations, 7 FORDHAM]' CORP. {';[ FIN. l. 
301,306 (2002); see also Bebchuk {';[ Fried, supra note 55, at 869-70 (Originally raising this uneasiness 
in the context of examining the efficiency and distributional consequences of secured lending); but cf 
Schwarcz, Securitization Post-Enron, supra note 40, at 1570-71 (arguing that securitization does not 
harm non-adjusting creditors). 
204. Cf. Part m.c (Internalizing Externalities), attempting to resolve this issue. 
205. See Schwarcz, Securitization Post-Enron, supra note 40, at 1569 (analyzing the impact of se-
curitization on unsecured and non-adjusting creditor classes, and concluding that its harm should be 
non-material and indeed is likely to be zero or even negative). 
206. rd. at 1570 (arguing that although individual non-adjusting creditors sometimes will be 
harmed where an originator that overinvests securitization proceeds later goes bankrupt, this harm 
must be weighed against benefits that stem from a lower interest-cost burden and improved liqUidity). 
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benefit from securitization,207 any net harm should be non-material (and perhaps 
even zero or negative)208 Therefore, securitization structures should not cause 
manifest net harm. 
Absent net harm, the remaining inquiry under the Rule is whether the con-
tracting parties engage in securitization intentionally to cause harm. Though one 
commentator has made that allegation,209 others have soundly refuted it. 2l O Inten-
tional harm therefore appears unlikely. 
Externalities alone therefore do not justify recharacterizing securitization sale 
contracts. Accordingly, there is no need, under the Rule, to analyze whether 
securitization-sale structures contain material improprieties. 211 The muddled state 
of the recharacterizing-sales jUrisprudence nonetheless may reflect, in addition to 
uncertainty over the amount of harm,212 that judges have at least impliCitly grap-
pled with the issue of improprieties. Although improprieties would be expected 
to be rare because securitization-sale contracts are arm's-length negotiated agree-
ments, some courts might infer the existence of improprieties simply because a 
securitization-sale structure bears some economic or other similarity to a secured 
loan-even though the structure does not bear a greater resemblance to a secured 
loan than a sale.213 Under the Rule, those improprieties should be irrelevant. 
4. CollapsingLBO Transactions 
Applying the Rule to these transactions, the first inquiry is whether respecting 
LBO structures would thwart or significantly impair legislative policies. Although 
there might be arguments to the contrary.214 it does not appear that LBO trans-
actions thwart or impair any such policies. Some LBO transactions could be 
207. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
208. This reflects that net harm, as the term is used in this Article, is a Kaldor-Hicks concept, 
comparing aggregate harm to aggregate benefit. 
209. See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.]. 1,30 (1996) (alleging that "[alsset 
securitization may be the silver bullet capable of killing liability."); Lynn M. LoPucki, The Irrefutable 
Logic of judgment Proofing: A Reply to Professor Schwanz, 52 STAN. L. REV. 55 (1999). 
210. See, e.g., White, supra note 24; Schwarcz, The Inherent Irrationality ofJudgment Proofing, supra 
note 20; Charles W Mooney, judgment Proofing, Bankruptcy Policy, and the Dark Side of Tort Liability, 
52 STAN. L. REV. 73 (1999); Steven L. Schwarcz, judgment Proofing: A Rejoinder, 52 STAN. L. REV. 77 
(1999). Although certain of Enron's structured transactions were alleged to be non-arm's length "sham 
transactions that have no legitimate business purpose and mislead investors, analysts, and regulators 
about companies' activities, tax obligations, and true financial condition" (SENATE PERMANENT SUB-
COMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, REPORT ON FISHTAIL, BACCHUS, SUNDANCE, AND SLAPSHOT: FOUR ENRON 
TRANSACTIONS FUNDED AND FACILITATED BY U.s. FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, S. REP. No. 107-82, at 2 
(2003), available at http://govt-aff.senate.gov/010203psireport.pdf (last visited Oct. 1, 2004)), those 
transactions were not securitization transactions. See Schwarcz, Enron and the Use and Abuse of Special 
Purpose Entities in Corporate Structures, supra note 1, at 1315-16. 
211. That need is obviated because, irrespective of any such improprieties, the securitization-sale 
structure does not cause net harm. 
212. See supra note 204 and accompanying text. 
213. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
214. Possible contrary arguments might pertain to the fairness of LBO transactions to shareholders 
(cf Gregory ]. Schwartz, Regulation of Leveraged Buyouts to Protect the Public Shareholder and Enhance 
the Corporate Image, 35 CATH. U. L. REV. 489 (1986)) or the implications of LBO transactions for tax 
policy (cf Patricia L. Bryan, Leveraged Buyouts and Tax Policy, 65 N.C. L. REv. 1039 (1987)). 
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viewed as inconsistent with legislative policy under fraudulent conveyance law, 
but those transactions would be subject to avoidance under that law.215 Once 
voided, they neither would thwart nor impair that policy To this extent, the Rule 
predicts existing jUrisprudence. 
The next inquiry is whether a given LBO structure has material improprieties 
and, if so, whether it causes manifest net harm or the parties know or should 
know that it is substantially certain to cause harm. The potential for impropriety 
arises where the LBO causes the target firm to become insolvent, leading to its 
failure. In fact, the actual LBO jurisprudence identifies this type of impropriety 
as a basis to collapse an LBO structure in order to undo the priority of the LBO 
lender.216 
Mere impropriety, however, is insufficient under the Rule to justify collapse. 
The Rule would collapse an LBO structure only if, in addition to the impropriety, 
the structure causes manifest net harm or the parties know or should know that 
it is substantially certain to cause harm. Consider first net harm. Admittedly, a 
failed LBO harms the claims of the target firm's existing creditors.217 Courts, 
though, have not yet explicitly gone the extra step contemplated by the Rule, 
attempting to balance that harm against any benefits of engaging in LBO trans-
actions. Those benefits can be significant, including the premium received by the 
target firm's shareholders.218 They also might include a range of intangible policy 
benefits. 219 
Because of these intangibles, it can be especially difficult to assess the existence 
of net harm in the context of LBO transactions. Even the proposed "manifest net 
harm" standard might not necessarily help. Perhaps implicitly for this reason, in 
the one case actually collapsing an LBO structure the court collapsed only the 
portion of that structure involving the LBO lender's collateral220 Such a partial 
collapse would preserve most of the benefits of the LBO transaction, including 
the premium received by the target firm's shareholders and the intangible policy 
benefits, while also mitigating the harm to the target firm's creditors. 221 This rep-
resents a practical variation on this Article's balancing test. 
215. See 11 U.s.c. § 548 (2000). 
216. U.S. v. Tabor Court Realty Corp., 803 f2d 1288, 1296 Ord Cir. 1986) (looking to whether 
the LBO lender knew or should have known that the LBO structure would lead to insolvency). 
217. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text (observing that because borrowed LBO funds 
add to the target firm's overall debt burden without increasing its assets, and in many cases existing 
claims are also effectively subordinated to claims of the LBO lender, existing creditors are prejudiced 
if the target firm becomes insolvent or goes bankrupt). 
218. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
219. See Baird &: Jackson, supra note 3, at 853 (arguing that LBO "transactions do not seem to be 
clearly to the detriment of creditors .... With the buyout may come more streamlined and more 
effective management. Among other things, a going-private transaction may save the costs of comply-
ing with relevant federal securities statutes."). 
220. Supra notes 63 and 216 and accompanying text. CJ. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw, 
(6th ed.), supra note 91, at 25 ("[Flew judicial opinions contain explicit references to economic 
concepts [butl [ilt would not be surprising to find that many legal doctrines rest on inaniculate 
gropings toward efficiency"). 
221. The harm to the target firm's creditors would be mitigated because their claims now become 
pari passu with the claim of the LBO lender, whose collateral has been invalidated. They still would 
be harmed, however, in their capacity as creditors of the now-insolvent target firm. 
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Even absent net harm, the Rule would collapse an LBO structure with material 
improprieties where the contracting parties know or should know that the struc-
ture is substantially certain to cause harm. That scenario, however, is unlikely as 
a practical matter. LBO transactions require lenders to put significant amounts of 
their money at risk. 222 To avoid litigation, LBO lenders already go to great lengths 
to ensure that the target firm's creditors are not harmed. It is, for example, stan-
dard and customary for such lenders to insist on independent analyses from 
reputable independent valuation firms that, after giving effect to the LBO, the 
target firm will be solvent, able to pay its debts, and adequately capitalized. 223 
When undertaken, this due diligence provides the lender a defense. Similarly, 
under the Rule, the due diligence would obviate a finding of intent to cause harm. 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
This Article attempts to answer one of the most fundamental questions in 
corporate law: When is a corporate structure legitimate, and when should it be 
collapsed? Although judges and scholars have attempted to answer this question 
in isolated doctrinal contexts, they have not seen the question as cutting across 
doctrines or attempted to formulate rules of general application, much less an 
overall theory from which to derive such rules. This failure leaves the law with 
unsettling ad hocery, which in tum creates uncertainty, inconsistency, and ineffi-
ciency on multiple levels. 
Collapsing or recharacterizing a corporate structure involves collapsing or re-
characterizing the corporate contractual arrangements that constitute the struc-
ture. Because the raison d'etre of contracting is efficiency, externalities should be 
allowed to defeat contract enforcement only where they cause the contracting in 
question to become economically inefficient.224 Although the real-world operating 
standard of efficiency is Kaldor-Hicks, that standard may be insufficient because 
it takes externalities into account only in the aggregate balanCing of benefit and 
harm. A Pareto efficiency standard, however, would fail because virtually all cor-
porate structures are, to some extent, subject to non-internalized externalities. 
This Article therefore employs a two-step analysis. First, it uses a Kaldor-Hicks 
standard of efficiency for collapsing (inefficient) corporate structures; second, it 
examines the extent to which, notwithstanding Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, corporate 
structures should be collapsed (or other remedies provided) in order to internalize 
externalities. This approach resolves the dilemma that neither Kaldor-Hicks effi-
ciency nor Pareto efficiency alone provides an adequate standard.225 
Utilizing this approach, the Article first argues that a corporate structure should 
be legitimate....,....meaning that the structure should be respected, and contracting 
222. See supra note 48. 
223. Schwarcz, Rethinking a Corporation's Obligations to Creditors, supra note 48, at 685. 
224. The Article also argues that contract enforcement should be defeated where the corporate 
structure itself thwarts or significantly impairs a legislative policy Rarely, however, does a corporate 
structure have that impact. 
225. See supra notes 87-102 and accompanying text. 
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parties should not be liable for harm caused by the structure226-unless the struc-
ture (x) thwarts or significantly impairs legislative policies, or (y) has material 
improprieties and causes either net harm (meaning that, taking into account ex-
ternalities, the aggregate harm of the structure exceeds its aggregate benefit) or 
intentional externalities. The underlying rationale for this proposed rule is that 
allowing Kaldor-Hicks efficient freely-negotiated corporate structures that inter-
nalize intentional externalities should be the socially optimal result even though 
the failure to internalize unintentional externalities may discourage some market 
participants at the margin. 
The Article then tests this rule by applying it to various doctrines under which 
courts have actually collapsed or recharacterized corporate structures. The rule 
helps explain and interrelate these doctrines, adding predictability and conceptual 
justification to the jurisprudence of piercing the corporate veil; explaining the 
relationship between, and providing a basis to harmonize, that doctrine and the 
doctrine of substantive consolidation; and providing conceptual guidance and 
clarity to the doctrines of collapsing LBO transactions and distinguishing loans 
from sales. 
The testing also reveals that the rule would benefit from several practical mod-
ifications. Determining the existence of net harm can be difficult, and would be 
even more difficult where collapsing or recharacterizing a corporate structure 
would hurt legitimate creditors who relied on the structure. This difficulty is 
compounded because the mere possibility of a judge collapsing or recharacterizing 
the structure adds uncertainty to credit markets. To minimize mistakes and market 
disruption, the Article proposes that the rule's "net harm" reqUirement be restated 
as a "manifest net harm" requirement, measured by whether the aggregate harm 
caused by the structure manifestly exceeds the structure's aggregate benefit. This 
approach to proving net harm has precedent in related areas of law where it is 
likewise important to minimize mistakes and market disruption. 
Thus, a corporate structure should be respected, and the contracting parties 
should not be liable, unless the structure (x) thwarts or significantly impairs leg-
islative poliCies, or (y) has material improprieties and causes either manifest net 
harm or intentional externalities. To mitigate the burden of proving intent, the 
Article proposes that intent be inferred where the contracting parties know or 
should know that the structure is substantially certain to cause harm-an approach 
that has precedent in related areas of law where it is likewise important to strive 
for an objective standard of intentionality. 
One might ask whether this rule provides better guidance than existing juris-
prudence. I believe it does, and it certainly should not provide less guidance given 
the confused and inconsistent state of that jUrisprudence. Furthermore, even if 
courts are unwilling to adopt the rule as it stands, it still should have value as a 
conceptually-grounded model from which judges can discern the types of issues 
226. Courts sometimes may, and in order to minimize externalities to innocent creditors perhaps 
sometimes should, prefer a lesser remedy than collapsing a problematic corporate structure-such as 
imposing liability on the parties who created the structure. Nothing in this Article is meant to suggest 
that such a lesser remedy may not sometimes be appropriate. 
144 The Business Lawyer; Vo!' 60, November 2004 
and nuances they should be grappling with in order to determine which corporate 
structures are legitimate and which should be collapsed. 
The rule, and its derivation, also suggest an answer to what has been described 
as a "major conceptual problem" of contract law: determining which externalities 
are to count in constraining the ability of parties to contract with each other. 227 
In deriving the rule, I confronted this problem in the limited context of corporate 
contracts. I attempted to solve that problem from first prinCiples, however, and 
did not need to address particularities of corporation law other than to impose a 
requirement that any corporate structure being collapsed must have material im-
proprieties. That requirement, though, was needed principally to harmonize the 
rule with the limited-liability rule of corporation law. 22B In a non-corporate con-
text, therefore, a material-improprieties requirement should be unnecessary Ac-
cordingly, the externalities that are to count in constraining the ability of parties 
to contract with each other, this Article implicitly argues, are those that CD a 
contracting party knows or should know are substantially certain to cause material 
harm to third parties,229 or (ii) cause harm that manifestly exceeds the aggregate 
benefit of the contracting. no 
Because most of a corporate structure's externalities result from the limited-
liability rule of corporation law,231 it is useful in closing to examine how this 
Article's analysis might inform, or be informed by, the long-standing debate over 
that rule.232 That debate remains unresolved because limited liability "has costs 
as well as benefits, and those costs and benefits are sometimes in close balance."233 
This Article only indirectly informs that debate. Although both limited liability 
and collapsing corporate structures ultimately tum on the question of economic 
efficiency in the face of externalities, any resolution of the limited-liability debate 
appears intractable, requiring empirical evidence of whether the benefits of limited-
liability exceed its costs (such costs principally constituting externalities arising 
227. See supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
228. See supra notes 107-111 (discussing the material improprieties requirement). 
229. The materiality qualification is implicit in this Anicle's use of the term "externalities." See 
supra note 83 (stating that references to "externalities" mean externalities that satisfy the minimum 
threshold of causing material harm). 
230. This clause (in follows the definition of manifest net harm. See supra note 168 and accom-
panying text. 
231. See supra note 132 and accompanying text. Limited liability, the default rule in corporation 
law, means that shareholders of a firm are generally not liable for debts of the firm. Collapsing a 
corporate structure may collapse the limited-liability scheme associated with that structure. See supra 
Pans II.A and II.B. 
232. For a history of that debate, see Callison, supra note 66; Hansmann &: Kraakman, Toward 
Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, supra note 19; Larry E. Ribstein, Limited Liability and 
Theories of the Corporation, 50 MD. l. REV. 80 (1991); Susan E. Woodward, Limited Liability in the 
Theory of the Firm, 141 J. INST. &: THEORETICAL ECON. 601 (1985); Easterbrook &: Fischel, supra note 
15; Paul Halpern et aI., An Economic Analysis of Limited Liability in Corporation Law, 30 U. TORONTO 
l.J. 117 (1980); cf William W Bratton &: Joseph A. McCahery, An Inquiry into the Efficiency of the 
Limited Liability Company: Of Theory of the Firm and Regulatory Competition, 54 WASH. &: LEE L. REV. 
629 (1997). 
233. Henry Hansmann &: Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110 YALE L.J. 
387,423 (2000) [hereinafter Hansmann &: Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Lawl. 
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from the incentives that limited-liability creates for opportunistic behavior).234 In 
contrast, my analysis of collapsing corporate structures only needs to assume the 
existence of limited liability as the default rule-an assumption that reflects the 
reality of the world as we know it. 235 This makes the analysis more tractable, 
asking only when, in individual cases, the corporate structure (and thus limited 
liability) should be collapsed. That question is answerable because the claims of 
the relevant parties, including creditors-and thus the consequences of collapsing 
the structure-will be reasonably quantifiable if not known.236 
234. Hansmann & Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder Uability for Corporate Torts, supra note 
19, at 1879. "The question [of whether limited liability should be preserved] remains open chiefly 
because the merits of limited liability depend ... on empirical issues that are difficult to resolve on 
the basis of available evidence." ld. at 1880. For a detailed discussion of those incentives that limited 
liability creates for opportunistic behavior, see id.; see also Hansmann & Kraakman, The Essential Role 
of Organizational Law, supra note 233, at 423 (observing that the costs of limited liability "derive 
principally from the possibilities it creates for the firm's owners to act opportunistically toward business 
creditors."); Callison, Rationalizing Umited Uability and Veil Piercing, supra note 66, at 1063 (observing 
that" [lJimited liability protections create incentives for excessive risk taking by permitting firm owners 
to avoid the full costs of their business activities while reaping the full economic reward of such 
activities. "). 
235. Hansmann & Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder Uabiliry for Corporate Torts, supra note 
19, at 1879 (observing that "[lJimited liability ... has been the prevailing rule for corporations in the 
United States, as elsewhere, for more than a century."). Building a normative case on a foundation of 
unexamined assumptions has weighty precedent. See, e.g., Hansmann & Kraakman, The Essential Role 
of Organizational Law, supra note 233, at 391 (noting that although "[e]conomic theory does not offer 
a completely satisfactory explanation for the fact that productive activity is commonly organized in 
the form of large nexuses of contracts, in which a single central actor contracts simultaneously with 
employees, suppliers, and customers who may number in the thousands or even millions .... [W]e 
will not delve into [that subject] here. Rather, we will simply take it for granted .... "); Lucian Arye 
Bebchuk, A New Approach to Corporate Reorganizations, 101 HARV. L. REv. 775, 776-77 (1988) (as-
suming without examination the existence (and significant use) of the reorganization alternative to 
liquidation; and analyzing the best method for dividing the reorganization pie). 
236. One might ask why, if this Article's analysis starts with the implicit assumption that limited 
liability is the norm, that assumption sometimes is challenged. The Article helps to provide an answer: 
although allowing wholesale challenges would undermine contractual expectations, the existence of 
material improprieties in an underlying corporate structure provides a Signal to third parties that this 
assumption may be challenged for that particular structure. See supra notes 108-109 and accompa-
nying text. 

